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ABSTRACT 
The Effect of a Universal Basic Income on Life Decisions: Evidence from a Student Lab 
Experiment 
Tyler Wenande 
 
Director: Shane Nordyke, Ph.D. 
A Universal Basic Income (UBI) is an unconditional cash transfer administered universally 
regardless of employment or economic status. A UBI, while typically thought of as a response to 
rising income inequality or threatening automation, has the potential to achieve a number of 
effects, only some of which are economic. And while a UBI could have positive effects, there are 
some critiques of UBI that warrant merit and will be examined in this paper after discussing the 
potential positive effects. An experiment was designed to test some of the theories promoted by 
UBI critics and proponents. Subjects, divided into two groups with the treatment group receiving 
a UBI, played an economic game where they made decisions about work and leisure, 
consumption, education, and savings. Subjects decisions were recorded and data was analyzed 
using OLS multivariate regressions to reveal results that generally align with real-world pilots. 
UBI recipients work less when they can use that time to achieve higher levels of education. 
When there is no opportunity for education, there was no statistically significant difference in the 
amount of time that subjects spent working. UBI recipients also had higher savings and 
consumption levels. 
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Introduction 
 A universal basic income (UBI) is a universal, unconditional, cash payment regularly 
distributed to all individuals in a geographic area regardless of employment or economic status.1 
While it is not a new idea, UBI is receiving renewed attention on an international scale. Using 
both theoretical arguments and results from real-world pilot programs, UBI proponents can draft 
a strong case in support of a UBI, whose effects could include: reducing poverty, improving 
health outcomes and child development, mitigating the negative effects of automation on 
vulnerable workers, reducing rising economic inequality, promoting democratic participation, 
and ultimately separating paid work from survival. Critics of UBI often claim that the policy 
would be too expensive and would result in significant reductions in labor market participation, 
which would create negative economic outcomes.  
 This experiment created a simulation in which subjects were split into a treatment and 
control group and assigned one of four profiles with varying education levels and wages. The 
treatment group received a $12,000 UBI, and the control group did not. Subjects then made 
decisions about work, consumption, leisure, education, and savings for 10 rounds, with each 
round being one year. Panel data was collected by treating each round from each subject as an 
observation (n = 1020), while cross-sectional data was collected by aggregating each subject’s 
decisions to treat each participant as an observation (n = 102). Both panel and cross-sectional 
data were analyzed using multivariate OLS regressions to determine the effect of a universal 
basic income on the in-game life decisions made by simulation participants. It is hypothesized 
that UBI recipients would work slightly less, using most of that time to improve their education. 
                                                          
1 Philippe Van Parijs, Basic Income: a simple and powerful idea for the twenty-first century, (Politics & Society, 
2004), 4 
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Further, UBI recipients are hypothesized to increase savings while maintaining a comparable 
level of consumption to non-recipients. Finally, UBI recipients are hypothesized to use their 
transfer to pursue productive activities, increasing their score by more than the nominal value of 
the transfer.  
What is a Universal Basic Income? 
 While the term ‘universal’ may lead readers to believe that a UBI is one policy, there are 
a number of policy options that UBI advocates may pursue within a universalist framework.2 So 
while universal basic income policies are often discussed as if they are a singular policy, there 
are actually a number of UBI or UBI-like policies that, because of their unique policy 
construction, have unique effects. There are several dimensions along which UBI policies differ, 
including universality, individuality, conditionality, uniformity, frequency, modality, and 
adequacy.  
 While it would seem that universality is a rigid quality that would not change between 
two ‘universal’ policies, there are a number of groups that may be excluded from various 
‘universal’ policies. Non-citizens are commonly excluded from universal policies, for example.3 
In this sense, universality can be defined as covering everyone in a perceived political in-group: 
because non-citizens are not considered members of the society distributing universal benefits, 
they are not included in the universal scheme. Universality also implies that the basic income is 
not targeted.4 The UBI is paid to low-income earners, high-income earners, the jobless who seek 
work, and the jobless who don’t seek work alike.  
                                                          
2 Jurgen De Wispelaere & Lindsay Stirton, The many faces of universal basic income, (The Political Quarterly, 2004), 
266 
3 Ibid., 267 
4 Hilary W. Hoynes & Jesse Rothstein, Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries, (National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2019), 1 
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 Unlike traditional social programs, UBI payments are disbursed to individuals, not 
households. Some proponents of UBI have argued that, to better fit with traditional approaches, 
it would be acceptable to give benefits to households rather than individuals.5 This, however, 
would compromise some of the benefits that UBI holds over traditional programs. Under a UBI 
scheme, the amount of benefit an individual receives is independent of what type of household 
they belong to.6 This is unlike a traditional scheme, where the benefit amount for a household is 
less than what would be the aggregate sum of the benefits if the individuals lived separately. A 
UBI, then, by not reducing benefits for households with more than one individual, passes on the 
savings of shared accommodation to beneficiaries. Because of the program’s individual focus, 
UBI removes isolation traps and incentivizes communal living.7 
 A universal basic income is also unconditional. Aside from the various exclusions that 
result from one’s definition of universality, there are no conditions that prevent an individual 
from receiving a universal basic income. This is unlike traditional social programs, which are 
often accompanied by a requirement to work or seek work. There are also no conditions about 
how a UBI is spent. It may be saved for a rainy day, spent frivolously, invested meticulously, 
used to fund human capital investments like education, or any other purpose without restriction.8  
 The uniformity of a UBI concerns the level of benefit that each individual receives.9 
There are two different ways to define uniformity: in absolute and adjusted terms. Absolute 
uniformity is what is typically associated with UBI: each person receives the same check for the 
same nominal amount, regardless of personal characteristics or location. This means that the UBI 
                                                          
5 De Wispelaere & Stirton, The many faces of universal basic income, 271 
6 Van Parijs, Basic Income, 8 
7 Ibid., 8 
8 Ibid., 42 
9 De Wispelaere & Stirton, The many faces of universal basic income, 269 
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is formally uniform, but would provide different beneficiaries with different amounts of 
purchasing power due to differences in cost of living.10 Adjusted uniformity aims to distribute 
equal amounts of purchasing power to beneficiaries: while not formally uniform (different 
beneficiaries receive checks for different amounts), adjusted uniformity provides all beneficiaries 
parity in purchasing power by adjusting the universal basic income to account for external 
factors, like the regional cost of living.11 
 The frequency and timing of benefits can have a significant impact on the success of a 
UBI. A UBI is distributed in regular payments as opposed to in a lump-sum.12 The timing of UBI 
benefits – whether they are distributed weekly, monthly, or annually – does make a difference. 13 
The timing of payments can be designed to incentivize or avoid certain behaviors: annual 
payments, for example, may better promote larger investment than smaller, more frequent 
payments. Alternatively, more frequent payments may be more practical if the policy’s goal is to 
give individuals subsistence. The timing of benefits could also be determined by the surrounding 
administrative or social frame: because traditional social program benefits and wages are 
distributed bi-weekly, it may be desirable for UBI benefits to follow that scheme.14  
 The mode of a transfer refers to the shape that a transfer takes, namely whether the 
transfer is a cash or in-kind transfer.15 A UBI, by definition, is a cash transfer, although some 
social policies similar to a UBI advocate for in-kind transfers over cash. Additionally, modality 
can be expanded to include the method of disbursing cash benefits. There may be differences in 
                                                          
10 De Wispelaere & Stirton, The many faces of universal basic income, 269 
11 Ibid., 269 
12 Van Parijs, Basic Income, 5 
13 De Wispelaere & Stirton, The many faces of universal basic income, 270 
14 Ibid., 270 
15 Ibid., 270 
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behavior that result from receiving a monthly check compared to having benefits removed from 
an individual’s year-end taxes, similar to a negative income tax (NIT).  
 A final aspect of a universal basic income is the policy’s adequacy to satisfy 
beneficiaries’ basic needs.16 An adequate UBI should be large enough to cover an individual or 
family’s basic needs without other sources of income.17 In most versions of UBI, the universal 
benefit supplements existing income, in-kind transfers, and some cash transfers; UBI does not 
phase out with new incomes and does not need to replace all existing social programs.18 While it 
is possible that an adequately large UBI would be able to provide universal basic security 
without additional social programs, the abolition of traditional social programs is not a hallmark 
of a universal basic income. Some believe that a UBI does not need to be fixed at subsistence 
level, arguing that UBI benefits could either exceed or fall short of covering basic necessities.1920 
This author would argue that a universal basic income that does not cover necessities is not a 
universal basic income at all, just a universal income. Any interpretation of the term ‘basic’ in 
universal basic income ought to include affording basic security. If a UBI is not intended to 
afford basic security, it is not a true universal basic income.  
 So, what would a universal basic income look like in the United States? While a UBI as 
discussed above – universal, unconditional, and substantial enough to live on – has never been 
implemented in a wealthy country like the United States or, for that matter, even in a large scale 
pilot experiment.21 Clark (2003) has offered a model for a UBI in the U.S. Every person 18 years 
                                                          
16 De Wispelaere & Stirton, The many faces of universal basic income, 271 
17 Hoynes & Rothstein, Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries, 1 
18 Van Parijs, Basic Income, 14 
19 Ibid., 271 
20 Van Parijs, Basic Income, 4-5 
21 Hoynes & Rothstein, Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries, 17 
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or older would receive a benefit equal to the poverty line for a single person living alone. This 
model would provide a second level of benefits to people under 18, set below the poverty line 
but high enough to guarantee that family income would be at least equal to the poverty line for a 
family of a given size. In 2008, Joseph Kennedy, former chief economist at the U.S. Department 
of Commerce, proposed a basic income of $1,250 per month.22  
 One concern shared by UBI advocates and opponents alike is the how a UBI would 
interact with policies already in place. Two UBI policies that are similar in design may produce 
very different outcomes because of how the policies interact with the existing social policy 
framework.23 One way to minimize this problem would be to integrate a UBI into the existing 
social policy framework as much as possible. This could include dispersing benefits in similar 
intervals using similar or familiar means. Providing basic security through the use of a negative 
income tax (NIT) could afford beneficiaries basic security through the use of a familiar 
mechanism. An NIT, using refundable tax credits, would guarantee tax filers a minimum 
income.24 Individuals with taxable income receive a benefit that is equal to the difference 
between the tax credit and their tax liabilities. Filers with no income receive the full benefit in 
cash, similar to a UBI. At the breakeven level, an individual’s tax liabilities are exactly equal to 
the credit; no benefit is received, but no net taxes are paid. Individuals with an income exceeding 
the credit would pay taxes, as the NIT credit is less than the amount of taxes owed. While an NIT 
and UBI are capable of achieving the same levels of wealth redistribution, there are several 
important dimensions along which an NIT varies from a UBI.25 These include the dispersal of 
                                                          
22 John Kay, The basics of basic income, (Intereconomics, 2017), 71 
23 De Wispelaere & Stirton, The many faces of universal basic income, 271 
24 Philip L. Harvey, The relative cost of a universal basic income and a negative income tax, (Basic Income Studies, 
2006), 2 
25 Ibid., 4 
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benefits only to those who file for taxes, as well as the distribution of benefits in the form of tax 
credits as opposed to cash.  
 Having discussed what a UBI is and is not, the question arises: why does UBI warrant 
study? UBI, after all, would be a drastic, potentially expensive, departure from traditional social 
policy. But the adversarial policy approach – dismissing UBI purely because of its dissimilarities 
with the traditional policy approach – does not provide a useful framework for decision 
making.26 Analyzing and considering radical policy changes may be worthwhile in the face of 
long-term risks associated with the continuation of the status quo.27 Refusing to modify the status 
quo in the face of social, political, and economic pressure increases polarization and threatens 
feelings of social solidarity, especially with younger generations.28  
Effect on Combatting Automation 
 The economic disruption resulting from automation is commonly cited as a reason to 
institute a UBI. It is well established that automation, globalization, and other large-scale 
economic shifts devalue and eventually eliminate established skills.29 And while opponents claim 
that automation is not a new phenomenon, automation in the future has the potential to be more 
disruptive than previous automation for two reasons. First, if technology advances at its current 
pace and is adopted quickly, workers could be displaced at a faster rate than in past economic 
shifts. Second, if many firms in different sectors adopt automation at the same time, the portion 
of the workforce affected by automation could be higher than in the past. Put simply, 21st century 
                                                          
26 De Wispelaere & Stirton, The many faces of universal basic income, 272 
27 Thomas Straubhaar, On the economics of a universal basic income, (Intereconomics, 2017), 80 
28 Ibid., 80 
29 Ugo Colombino, Basic income policies: theory and empirical evidence, (Focus, 2017), 21 
8 
 
automation could displace more workers at a faster rate than previous incidences of large-scale 
automation and economic transition.30  
 Automation will play a large role in shaping the future of labor in developed countries 
like the United States, where almost 25% (mid-point projection) to 45% (rapid adoption) of 
current work could be automated by 2030.31 39% of all jobs in the United States will be lost or 
destroyed while about 30% of those will be recovered through occupational switching and 
demand from new industries. This means that 9% of all jobs will be lost (mid-point) while labor 
markets will grow by about 15% due to new workers. Between 39 million (mid-point) and 73 
million (rapid adoption) workers will be displaced, and between 13-16 million (mid-point) and 
48-54 million (rapid adoption) workers will need to change occupations. Up to one-third of the 
workforce may need to be retrained by 2030. A wide range of jobs in predictable environments 
will be affected, including office support positions, assembly line positions, agricultural 
positions, and some customer service positions. Less affected will be jobs that involve human 
management, social interaction, and expertise.32  
 In the automated future, any available work will likely require more education and 
different skills. Jobs that require only secondary education will be harmed by automation and 
jobs that require at least a college education will benefit.33 Future jobs will require more social 
skills, advanced cognitive and logical abilities, and creativity.34 The task, then, will be to take 
individuals employed in predictable industries and give them the skills they need to succeed, like 
                                                          
30 James Manyika et. al, Jobs lost, jobs gained: Workforce transitions in a time of automation, (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2017), vi 
31 Ibid., 29 
32 Ibid., 6 
33 Ibid., 15 
34 Ibid., 15 
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critical thinking and creativity. This will be a daunting task, as the performance of predictable, 
monotonous tasks does not traditionally facilitate the development of critical thinking abilities or 
creativity. Because any adjustment will likely be painful for workers, income support must be 
provided to displaced workers to maintain their quality of life.35 Income support may also help 
workers to get educated, re-train, or take other actions to foster labor market re-entry.36 
 Assisting such a large volume of displaced workers with re-training and re-entry will be a 
challenge for which there are few successful examples.37 Labor markets will need to be more 
fluid to adequately accommodate rapid changes, but labor markets in advanced economies, 
particularly the United States, have become more rigid since the 1980s.38 Rigidities and 
imperfections in labor markets will impede the workers’ transitions to new jobs, fueling rising 
unemployment and falling wages. Because strong aggregate demand is essential to the new job 
creation accounted for in the mid-point and rapid adoption scenarios, displaced workers must 
have the means to maintain a decent standard of living, and therefore a decent standard of 
consumption.39 Some of the benefits from automation, therefore, should be redistributed to 
compensate displaced workers. A UBI would be an adequate way to compensate displaced 
workers, giving them the means to maintain a decent standard of living and pursue labor market 
re-entry.40 
                                                          
35 Hoynes & Rothstein, Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries, 3 
36 Ibid., 16 
37 Manyika et. al, Jobs lost, jobs gained, 124 
38 Ibid., 114 
39 Ibid., 4 
40 Colombino, Basic income policies, 21 
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Effect on Inequality and Democracy  
 If automation is not accompanied by a just redistribution of income, automation will 
drive up already-worsening economic inequality. Both income and wealth inequality are on the 
rise in the United States and other Western nations.41 In OECD countries, the richest decile make 
nine times the income of the poorest decile, the highest level in 50 years.42 In the United States, 
the pre-tax income of the bottom 50% of earners grew by 1% between 1980 and 2014 while 
incomes in the 50-90th percentiles grew by 42% and incomes in the top decile grew by 121%.43 
Indeed, since 1980, most developed economies have seen a higher share of income being 
captured by capital as opposed to labor, due in large part to automation and technical change.44 
21st century automation could increase the pace of already-growing economic inequality, and 
there is already evidence that the benefits of automation are not being equitably distributed.4546 
 Without a significant policy intervention, the current trend of increasing economic 
inequality will not be reversed. Most future job growth in the U.S. will be in jobs that are already 
high-paying: the lowest-paying 30% of jobs will lose about 2% of wages, the 30-70th percentiles 
will see wages depressed by 12%, and the highest-paying jobs will see incomes grow by 10%.47 
These projections are averages of mid-point scenario outcomes, and rapid or widespread 
adoption will further exacerbate this inequity. The demand for unskilled or uneducated labor will 
decrease while the demand for educated and skilled workers will increase, threatening a 
                                                          
41 Nat O’Connor, Three Connections between Rising Economic Inequality and the Rise of Populism, (Irish Studies in 
International Affairs, 2017), 29 
42 Elise Klein, Economic Rights and a Universal Basic Income, (Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity, 2018), 107 
43 Hoynes & Rothstein, Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries, 4 
44 Manyika et. al, Jobs lost, jobs gained, 17 
45 Michael Dickson, Living with Robots: Automation and Income Inequality in the 21st Century, (2017), 7 
46 Ugo Colombino, Is unconditional basic income a viable alternative to other social welfare measures?, (IZA World 
of Labor, 2019), 2 
47 Manyika et. al, Jobs lost, jobs gained, 103 
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vulnerable section of the workforce.48 A UBI, because it would transfer income from the owners 
of capital to laborers (and the non-working who do not own capital), would combat the economic 
inequality amplified by automation.49 This would allow non-capital owners to maintain a decent 
standard of living. Without a UBI, society will continue to be plagued by the harms of economic 
inequality. 
 Economic inequality has psychological, social, economic, and political 
consequences.50515253 Income inequality results in lower levels of life satisfaction, lower self-
esteem, more emotional distress, and risky coping behaviors for those on the unfavorable end of 
the income distribution.5455 Income inequality at the national level is associated with a collapse 
of trust, cohesion, and cooperation due to a perceived sense of unfairness and pervasive 
competition for social status.5657 Cooperation and trust are critical to both individual well-being 
and societal functions.58 A lack of cooperation also causes political efforts supporting vulnerable 
populations to fall apart, reinforcing the psychological consequences of inequality.59 Further, 
income inequality tends to reduce life expectancy for both women and men.60 In societies with 
                                                          
48 Manyika et. al, Jobs lost, jobs gained, 103 
49 Hoynes & Rothstein, Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries, 4 
50 Felix Cheung & Richard E. Lucas, Income inequality is associated with stronger social comparison effects: the 
effect of relative income on life satisfaction, (Journal of personality and social psychology, 2016), 5-6 
51 Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality: The Role of Race in Law, Markets, and Social Structures, 
(2007), 4 
52 Markus Brueckner & Daniel Lederman, Effects of income inequality on aggregate output, (The World Bank, 
2015), 2 
53 Terrence D. Hill & Andrew Jorgenson, Bring out your dead!: A study of income inequality and life expectancy in 
the United States, 2000-2010, (Health & Place, 2018), 2 
54 Cheung & Lucas, Income inequality is associated with stronger social comparison effects, 4 
55 Hill & Jorgenson, Bring out your dead!, 2 
56 Cheung & Lucas, Income inequality is associated with stronger social comparison effects, 4 
57 Hill & Jorgenson, Bring out your dead!, 3 
58 Kela, Basic income recipients experienced less financial insecurity, (Kansanelakelaitos – The Social Insurance 
Institution of Finalnd, 2019) 
59 Hill & Jorgenson, Bring out your dead!, 3 
60 Ibid., 5 
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high levels of income inequality, the social effects of inequality may negate any benefits of 
economic growth to disadvantaged groups: while they will receive a small gain to their absolute 
income, the amplification of social effects may negate, or even outweigh, the effects of income 
growth.61 Income inequality, especially when coupled with unemployment, increases crime and 
other social unrest, which depresses economic productivity.6263 Inequality, then, is increasing 
and, especially when coupled with unemployment, is associated with a host of personal and 
social harms. 
 There is reason to believe that a universal basic income could mitigate the social harms of 
income inequality. Because a UBI would be a large-scale redistribution of wealth, it is likely to 
reduce income inequality. Preliminary evidence from a UBI pilot in Finland also shows that 
receiving a basic income transfer caused beneficiaries to have more trust in other people (+8%) 
as well as institutions, including politicians (+12%), political parties, the police (+4.5%), and 
courts (+4.5%).6465 So not only would UBI reduce the level of income inequality, it could also 
mitigate the negative social effects of the remaining inequality.  
 Income inequality also has troubling economic and political implications. Examining 104 
countries between 1970 and 2010, Brueckner & Lederman (2015) find that income inequality has 
a substantial negative effect on GDP per capita growth and long-run GDP per capita.66  
Inequality also increases corruption: if there were no differences in individual wealth, no 
politician would have an incentive to “be bought” buy any one person.67 The concentration of 
                                                          
61 Cheung & Lucas, Income inequality is associated with stronger social comparison effects, 12 
62 McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality,  4-12 
63 Dickson, Living with Robots, 4 
64 Kela, Basic income recipients experienced less financial insecurity 
65 Trust was measured on a scale of 1-10 via a survey of both recipients and a control group. 
66 Brueckner & Lederman, Effects of income inequality on aggregate output, 15 
67 McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality,  13 
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wealth and the ability to effectively exercise political power causes governments to turn their 
backs on the interests of the non-elites by taking one or more of the following actions: cutting 
progressive taxes, deregulating industries, eliminating environmental regulations, limiting or 
reducing the amount of public resources that are dedicated to social services like education and 
healthcare.68 These actions reinforce existing income inequality, fueling more corruption. 
Societies, then, can be trapped in a cycle where income inequality causes corruption which, in 
turn, creates more income inequality.69 Corruption also tends to reduce investment by members 
of the non-elite, as the elites’ ability to exercise influence over the judiciary would lead a rational 
individual to conclude that the elite will always prevail.70 The threat of redistribution and social 
violence that accompany inequality also reduce the rate of return on all investments, chilling 
total investment and slowing growth.71 Inequality also slows growth by limiting a population’s 
access to education and other human capital, which tends to reinforce existing economic 
inequality.72 Growth is critical to democratic societies because it promotes pluralism, diversity, 
dissent, and commitment to democratic principles.73 
 Economic inequality can have significant negative effects on democracy and political and 
economic freedom. Inequality is the primary factor in determining political instability, as 
populist rhetoric commonly addresses the economic decline or uncertainty that restricts 
                                                          
68 Hill & Jorgenson, Bring out your dead!, 4 
69 McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 16-17 
70 Ibid., 19 
71 Ibid., 19 
72 Ibid., 20 
73 Ibid., 22 
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economic freedom.747576 Indeed, large changes in income or standards of living resulting from 
economic shocks can create strong political reactions.77 Economic shocks that reinforce income 
inequality – like automation – can jeopardize long-run growth.78 Reducing economic growth 
increases the support for extreme political platforms, which historically tend to oppress or 
marginalize minority groups.79 Women in particular have an acute stake in supporting 
democratic systems, as restrictive authoritarian governments are generally hostile towards 
women’s rights and gender equality.80  
 A UBI could improve economic growth by increasing aggregate demand, separate paid 
work from survival, and strengthen democracy. Along with a just distribution of wealth, a UBI 
would aid in achieving a just distribution of time and opportunity, allowing for more complete 
freedom. This would ensure that, while people have access to basic necessities like food, 
healthcare, and social services, they would also have the time to educate themselves and engage 
in politics.81 In this sense, the freedom provided by a universal basic income is essential to 
enabling democratic participation and protecting democratic principles. By supporting political 
stability and promoting democratic participation, a UBI could strengthen the American 
democracy. 
                                                          
74 Mark J. Roe & Jordan I. Siegel, Political instability: Effects on financial development, roots in the severity of 
economic inequality, (Journal of Comparative Economics, 2011), 6 
75 O’Connor, Three Connections between Rising Economic Inequality and the Rise of Populism, 29 
76 Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality, economic 
freedom and democracy, (European Journal of Political Economy, 2016), 21 
77 Robert Grafstein, The Political Economy of Extremism and Moderation, (7th general conference of the European 
consortium for political research, Bordeaux, 2013), 34-35 
78 Krieger & Meierrieks, Political capitalism, 21 
79 Markus Brueckner & Hans Peter Gruner, Economic growth and the rise of political extremism: theory and 
evidence, (2010), 2 
80 Patricia Schulz, Universal basic income in a feminist perspective and gender analysis, (Global social policy, 2017), 
90 
81 Klein, Economic Rights and a Universal Basic Income, 107 
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Effect on Poverty 
 Along with income inequality, a universal basic income could significantly reduce 
poverty. Before analyzing the potential of a UBI to reduce poverty, poverty must be defined. 
There are two ways to define poverty: absolutely and relatively.82 Absolute poverty is defined as 
a lack of resources to meet basic needs, while relative poverty is defined as possessing a level of 
resources that, while possibly enough to meet basic needs, is less than a certain proportion of 
resources possessed by others. Absolute poverty is measured by the poverty line, while relative 
poverty has fewer concrete measures. An individual experiences relative poverty when they feel 
less prosperous than those around them. For example, a single woman who makes $55,000 per 
year is not impoverished in absolute terms. But, if she lives in a neighborhood or locality where 
the average annual income is over $100,000, she may experience relative poverty by feeling 
impoverished compared to her neighbors. Both absolute and relative poverty have negative 
effects. 
 Absolute poverty has tangible effects in the United States. According to the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, more than 500,000 people are homeless on any 
given night, more than 30% of which are unsheltered.83 More than 75,000 of these individuals 
are chronically homeless, which HUD defines as an individual with a disability who has been 
continuously homeless for at least 1 year or has experienced four or more episodes of 
homelessness in the last 3 years that add up to at least 12 months.84 Poverty is associated with 
less human capital accumulation, meaning that the impoverished have fewer time and resources 
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to dedicate to acquiring new knowledge or skills.85 Because human capital is a driver of 
economic growth, areas with higher poverty rates experience slower per capita growth on 
average, ceteris paribus.86 Child poverty in the United States is particularly costly, with costs 
totaling more than $1 trillion per year, or 5.4% of GDP in 2015.87 These costs are clustered 
around the loss of economic productivity, increased healthcare costs, and costs stemming from 
the maltreatment of homeless children.88 But, while reducing poverty may seem expensive, it is 
more costly to allow poverty to persist. Estimates show that, for every dollar spent on reducing 
child poverty, the U.S. could save at least seven dollars by reducing the economic costs of 
poverty.89 Even disregarding the moral imperative to reduce poverty in a nation with more than 
adequate means to do so, it is in the best interest of the U.S. economy to dedicate resources to 
poverty reduction. 
 While it is clear that resources ought to be dedicated to reducing poverty, poverty 
reduction strategies must be reevaluated. Traditional poverty relief programs have suffered from 
significant drawbacks, including complexity, stigma, and poverty traps, that prevent the 
programs from reaching their maximum effectiveness. The American approach to social policy, 
as is the case with many developed nations with social safety nets, is comprised of a number of 
targeted band-aid solutions that were created for problems as they arose.90 Taken together, these 
policies depict an opaque, complicated, and makeshift system that is difficult for beneficiaries to 
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navigate.91 Universal basic income has the potential to replace an arbitrary, bureaucratic system 
with one that respects individuals’ dignity and agency. UBI could also cover the gaps in social 
coverage that have arisen as a result of piecemeal policymaking while also responding to new 
social safety gaps resulting from social and economic transitions.92 
 In addition to complexity, traditional poverty relief programs and their recipients are 
dogged by stigma. Participating in means-tested and eligibility-restricted social programs de 
facto reveals what many people consider to be sensitive, personal information, making 
participants feel stigmatized.93 Even the least intrusive, least demeaning procedures for means-
tested programs suffer from stigma.94 Stigma reduces the rate at which eligible individuals utilize 
services, decreasing the reach and impact of social programs.9596 A universal basic income, 
because of its universality, would not suffer from such a problem; there is no stigma in receiving 
a universal benefit.979899 Instead, a UBI could detangle the web of costly and demeaning factors 
of low-income life, allowing individuals to make freer decisions.100 Removing humiliation and 
stigma from low-income life may be perceived as a benefit in and of itself to those in poverty.101 
This possibility has been confirmed by pilot results from India, Namibia, and Uganda, where 
UBI-like transfers increased recipients’ sense of autonomy and responsibility while avoiding 
stigmatization.102 
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 One of the biggest critiques of social programs put forward by economists is the ‘poverty 
trap’ (‘welfare trap,’ ‘unemployment trap’). The poverty trap results when benefit phaseouts, in 
combination with the marginal taxes on new earned income, result in the lack of substantive 
monetary gains when beneficiaries pursue low-wage paid work as opposed to no work.103 Put 
another way, the poverty trap results when benefit phaseouts incentivize program beneficiaries 
not to work. Because working would require significant effort and adjustment without much (if 
any) financial gain, beneficiaries are incentivized to abstain from paid work in order to maximize 
their well-being. With a universal basic income, however, benefit payments are neither 
interrupted nor reduced when accepting a job.104 Some authors argue that the imposition of a flat 
tax on income would be necessary to eliminate the poverty trap.105 This, however, is untrue. The 
poverty trap, by definition, is eliminated when basic security no longer depends on means-tested 
programs. Because basic security is not threatened by taking on paid work under a UBI scheme, 
work is not disincentivized. Even under a progressive tax system, there is no poverty trap 
because there is no benefit phaseout. A universal basic income, even funded by a progressive tax 
scheme, would not suffer from poverty traps.106 
 A universal basic income has incredible potential to reduce poverty more effectively than 
traditional, in-kind, means-tested programs. While a smaller proportion of funds would go to 
lower-income individuals than under the current system, a UBI would increase the absolute 
amount of transfer payments, creating what could be a very large downward redistribution of 
wealth.107 If a UBI comes entirely at the expense of existing programs, however, those in poverty 
                                                          
103 Van Parijs, Basic Income, 9-10 
104 Ibid., 10 
105 Harvey, The relative cost of a universal basic income and a negative income tax, 6 
106 Colombino, Basic income policies, 16 
107 Hoynes & Rothstein, Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries, 14 
19 
 
could be worse-off than they were before.108 It is important, then, when implementing a universal 
basic income, to carefully target which social programs, if any, can be subsumed by the universal 
basic income.  
 Trials in the developing world have revealed a strong positive effect of unconditional 
cash transfers on low-income recipients.109 Even modest transfers have measurably improved 
recipients’ standard of living.110 A pilot program in Namibia reduced food poverty by 60 
percentage points, or almost 80%, benefitting both children and adults alike.111 In India, 
unconditional transfers improved food security and reduced malnutrition, improving health 
outcomes as a result.112 This is true in the developed world as well. Preliminary results from 
Finland’s UBI trial revealed that recipients experienced less stress, fewer financial worries, and 
described their financial situation more positively than non-recipients.113 Even UBI recipients 
who did experience financial difficulties reported less stress than non-recipients. UBI recipients 
also reported living more comfortably, coping better with life’s troubles, and were less likely to 
find life difficult or very difficult.114 Unconditional cash transfers of even a modest amount can 
contribute to long-term poverty reduction.115 
 A universal basic income could also be flexible enough to address a variety of needs that 
the program wasn’t necessarily intended to address.116 The secondary benefits of UBI could be 
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expansive, including but not limited to: greater school attendance, less food insecurity, less 
economic crime, increased participation in communities, and improving health outcomes.117 
Experimental results from Manitoba, Namibia, and Finland have confirmed that a UBI may have 
numerous unintended secondary benefits.118119 Cash transfers given to low-income families 
support basic needs and investments for children, including education.120 Further, there is 
political value in the universality of UBI. Universal programs, like social security and Medicare, 
are a signal of inclusion and social acceptance. Along these lines, a universal basic income could 
be a way of expressing that all members of a society are valued and deserve basic economic 
security, potentially increasing the political viability of the program.121 
 A publicized waste of transfer payments would be guaranteed to eliminate social and 
political support for UBI. There could be no faster way for the program to become unpopular 
than people “blowing their grants on cocaine or wild holidays.”122 But evidence from pilot 
programs suggests that people do not waste their transfer. Quite the opposite: when you give 
money to people who need it, no strings attached, it gets used well.123 In Namibia, citizens 
prevented transfers from being wasted on alcohol. Entirely free of direction or guidance, the 
Namibians self-organized and created a council that convinced alcohol sellers to close their 
stores on the day that transfer benefits were received.124 Continual unconditional payments also 
do not foster dependency. Again in Namibia, most of the transfer payment was spent on assets 
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that improved economic creativity, increasing households’ ability to earn, improving their 
quality of life.125 In Kenya, researchers concluded that cash transfers have positive, sustained 
effects, and the benefits are not “consumed away.”126 Exactly the opposite: by allowing 
households to meet their needs, accumulate assets, and eventually diversify their livelihoods, 
they can make a positive contribution to sustainable economic growth.127128  
Effect on Health & Development 
 Closely related to a UBI’s impact on poverty is its impact on health and development. A 
UBI could help to reduce health inequities, defined by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as 
avoidable inequalities in health outcomes, that have resulted in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis.129 Income and income security are the most important social determinants of health, 
meaning that a lack of or insecure income can have negative effects on health outcomes.130 By 
increasing income security, a UBI could have positive long-run effects on health and 
development, particularly for children.131 This theoretical possibility has been bolstered by data 
from pilot projects. An NIT pilot in the United States found that receiving transfers improved 
housing and health conditions.132 Unconditional transfers in Alaska and Manitoba have led to 
improved birth outcomes.133134 Results from a Kenyan experiment showed that unconditional 
transfers increased happiness, life satisfaction, and reduced stress, depression, and instances of 
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domestic violence.135 Pilot results from Manitoba and India found a notable reduction in 
healthcare utilization and occurrences of common illnesses, respectively.136 Because low-income 
individuals utilize a disproportionate amount of healthcare services in comparison to their high-
income counterparts, reducing healthcare utilization could create serious economic savings.137 
 In addition to improving health outcomes, a UBI could have positive effects for long-
term child development. Early development is critical for children: the early stages of 
development influence children physically and behaviorally, affecting health and employment 
outcomes later in life.138139 Increasing parents’ income can lead to improved school attendance 
and better grades for children, which may translate into greater self-investments in human capital 
and higher wages.140141 Indeed, a number of studies have provided a positive link between an 
unconditional basic income and literacy rates, dropout rates, and grades. In an Indian UBI pilot, 
many beneficiaries spent their transfer on school supplies for their children, boosting school 
enrollment by 12%.142 In a Namibian pilot, 90% of the local school’s fees were paid in full, 
which was described as an “unprecedented achievement” for the school.143 These effects hold 
true for the developed world as well: pilot results from Manitoba, Canada revealed dramatic 
increases in high school attendance while families were receiving unconditional transfers.144 
Boosting school attendance and educational achievement improves health outcomes because 
achieving higher levels of education leads to a healthier lifestyle and a lengthened life 
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expectancy.145A UBI, then, may have multigenerational effects that last for decades after the 
transfer program is initially implemented. These effects, because they would not be immediately 
revealed, will likely not be captured by pilot experiments. While their magnitude remains 
unknown, the potential multigenerational effects of a universal basic income warrant 
consideration. 
Cost 
 The most pervasive criticism of a universal basic income is the cost. The cost of a UBI 
could vary widely among different proposals depending on policies’ benefit levels, funding 
mechanisms and exclusions, as well as the programs that the UBI would replace.146 Some cost 
estimates from developed UBI policy proposals with a benefit at the poverty level range from 
$2-3 trillion.147148 This, obviously, would require a significant increase in government revenue 
collections and spending. But before discussing possible UBI funding mechanisms, there are 
several ways that the total cost of a UBI can be reduced. First, a full UBI would make obsolete 
some federal programs like TANF and SNAP.149 Additionally, the universal basic income could 
become a more targeted basic income: exclusions can be made for age or family income. 
Excluding people from eligibility could reduce the cost of a UBI by 20% (although the program 
would no longer be considered universal).150 Similarly, reducing the benefit to children 16 years 
or younger by 50% could reduce the cost of a UBI by another 10-20%.151 Removing obsolete 
programs will also bring cost savings, although to what extent is unknown. Excluding wealthy 
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households from transfers by creating an income requirement could significantly reduce the cost 
of a UBI, as the cost of transferring cash to net-contributing families accounts for a notable 
amount of the cost of a UBI.152 Eliminating existing transfer programs and creating eligibility 
requirements, however, may have consequences that ultimately reduce the effectiveness of a 
universal basic income-like policy.  
 While the absolute cost of a UBI may be daunting, there are a litany of funding 
mechanisms available to policymakers that, together, are more than capable of raising the 
required amount of revenue. New government programs can be funded by using new or existing 
revenue. Programs funded by existing revenue do not require new taxes. Instead, existing funds 
are reallocated to fund the new program. Programs funded with new revenue require new or 
raised taxes. A UBI cannot be fully funded by existing revenue, but there is no reason that a UBI 
can’t be partially funded by reallocating existing revenue. For example, the cost of a UBI could 
be reduced by eliminating now-obsolete programs and reducing defense spending. A UBI could 
also be partially funded by increasing appropriations to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
Increasing the IRS’s resources would improve compliance with tax laws, raising tax collections 
without raising tax rates.153 Expanding enforcement options for the IRS would be an effective 
way to reduce noncompliance and increase revenue collections without changing tax rates.154 
 There are also a number of changes in the tax code that could be made to fund a UBI. 
Many UBI proposals propose adopting a flat tax rate. But, due to the effects of income 
inequality, it may be desirable to fund a UBI through progressive taxation.155 Progressive 
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taxation would raise the breakeven point (the point where taxes owed is exactly equal to the 
UBI) by raising taxes on higher-income earners. Raising the tax rate on corporate earnings and 
incomes over $1 million could raise a significant amount of revenue. A wealth tax is another 
option. Other authors have discussed a land or resource tax.156 Comparable to the Alaska 
Permanent Fund, a dividend from all non-green energy production in the U.S. could be used to 
fund a UBI. Alternatively, a tax on carbon emissions could be used to fund the UBI while 
making marginal progress in the fight against irreversible climate change. Some have suggested 
that a UBI, because it is a dividend on socially created wealth, be funded by the return on 
publicly owned assets.157 Alternatively, a UBI could be funded by a tax on privately-owned 
wealth created at the expense of larger society, like a tax on automation. Other modern tax 
options include a value-added tax (VAT), taxes on speculative capital investment (Tobin taxes), 
or taxes on transfers of information (bit taxes). One proposal raises nearly $2 trillion in new 
revenue by using a combination of sources: eliminating some tax exemptions, eliminating 
programs deemed by the proposal’s author to be made obsolete by the UBI, reducing defense 
spending, reverting the tax code to the code in 1994 while adding a 20% “surcharge” to incomes 
over $1 million, and extending the payroll tax to all earned income.158 While the cost of a UBI 
may be large, it is clear that policymakers have the means to properly fund an adequate UBI. 
Effect on Work 
 The second primary obstacle to the institution of a universal basic income is the 
perception that masses of people will exit the labor market to live on their UBI (known as free-
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riding or surfing), creating an immediate and total societal collapse. After outlining the argument 
against surfing, it will be demonstrated that this concern is overblown and lacks moral authority. 
 Some of the biggest behavioral questions surrounding UBI involve work incentives and 
labor market participation.159 Economic theory would predict that, because a UBI must be 
funded with taxes, higher marginal tax rates would cause individuals to work less. Individuals 
would have an incentive not to work because the monetary gain they would receive from 
working an additional hour would be reduced.160 Some evidence has shown that a 10% increase 
in unearned income will reduce earned income anywhere from 0.5% to 1%.161162 An analysis of 
Alaska Permanent Fund transfer recipients found that part-time employment increased by 17%, 
and there was no effect on overall employment.163 In the series of NIT experiments in the U.S., 
very few individuals exited the labor market after becoming eligible for the transfer.164 Those 
who did leave the labor force were likely to be mothers or individuals who had been forced to 
drop out of school because of financial difficulties.165 When given the ability to go back to 
school to improve future outcomes, they chose to do so.  
 If there were a significant number of surfers who decided to drop out of the labor market, 
a UBI may become economically infeasible due to the loss of necessary tax base.166 Even a small 
number of surfers, opponents claim, may prove to be problematic, as the perception of surfing 
will encourage others to surf, creating a snowball effect. Indeed, social factors have been 
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revealed as a strong influencer of labor market decisions.167 While some microsimulations 
suggest a UBI may have negative labor market effects, the question is far from answered.168169 
Advances in behavioral economics have raised questions about the validity of the rational actor 
(homo economicus) assumptions on which the negative labor market effects are based.170 The 
traditional relationship between unearned income and work assumed by economic theory may 
warrant question. 
 There are two primary reasons to question the assumption that unearned subsistence 
would provide a significant disincentive to work. Not only does this assumption create an 
unrealistic image of individuals’ aversion to work, it also ignores other incentives for businesses 
and individuals.171 There are a number of reasons individuals might pursue paid work – income 
is only one of a set of factors that determine labor market participation.172 Paid work can offer 
social contact, rewarding activity, and social recognition or prestige in ways that cannot be 
achieved without paid work.173174 Alternatively, people may choose to not pursue work not 
because they are lazy, but because the available work does not provide these benefits.175 
Therefore, higher marginal tax rates may have a lesser impact on individuals’ decisions to work 
than working conditions and social factors.176 
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 Often omitted from the conversation about unconditional income and work is the impact 
of surfing on wages. If people were to drop out of the labor market en masse, employers would 
raise wages to induce surfers back to work.177 Assuming that surfers can’t be enticed back into 
the labor market is unrealistic: everyone has a price.178 Further, there is reason to believe that a 
UBI would create incentives to enter work by removing the poverty trap.179 Additionally, 
because workers with more human capital tend to work more and a UBI has been shown to 
increase investments in human capital, a UBI may encourage recipients to enter the labor 
market.180 A UBI, then, creates a disincentive to work in the fact that one’s ability to maintain 
the bare minimum level of subsistence is not impacted by their decision to not pursue paid 
work.181  
 A universal basic income could have a number of positive effects on the labor market and 
economy by increasing entrepreneurship, human capital investments, and granting more 
bargaining power to workers, all of which could encourage UBI recipients to pursue paid 
work.182183184 A UBI could encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking by providing an income floor 
that guarantees subsistence in the event of failure.185 A UBI, even if it is protected from creditors 
(as it ought to be), will ease borrowing constraints, making it easier for beneficiaries to get loans 
to pursue their entrepreneurial and educational goals.186187 This creates greater opportunities for 
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UBI recipients.188 Pilot programs have revealed the impact of these incentives: most of the 
unconditional transfer from a Ugandan program was used to acquire a new skill, raising their 
incomes by 40%.189 A Namibian pilot found that unconditional cash transfers increased 
economic creation activities by 25%.190 In India, unconditional transfers reduced household debt 
and the use of predatory lenders. In addition to the financial and marketplace effects, this 
allowed Indian transfer recipients to better access government programs for which they were 
eligible even before receiving the transfer.191 The same idea holds true for switching jobs: UBI 
encourages individuals to try out new ideas or train for new jobs.192193 A large number of UBI 
recipients in experimental pilots have used their benefit to cover either new training or the costs 
associated with changing jobs, like relocation.194 Further, because individuals with more human 
capital tend to work more, the use of a UBI to improve human capital will naturally offset, to an 
extent that is currently unknown, any potential reductions in labor supply.195 Ultimately, a 
universal basic income gives individuals the financial ability, and possibly the motivation, to 
invest in new skills or find new jobs, which eventually translates into higher wages.196197 
 The ability of laborers to more easily switch jobs or exit the labor market entirely will 
improve the relative power of labor compared to capital. A guaranteed income floor would 
provide the ability to leave a job without compromising basic security, giving low-wage workers 
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the bargaining power to petition for higher wages.198 Bargaining power in the workplace and the 
ability to take on non-market work will change employer-employee relations to benefit 
workers.199200 Because employees will have more individual and collective power, employers 
have greater incentives to acknowledge new and existing forms of workplace organization, 
improving the quality of work.201202 This includes preventing the spread of “bullshit jobs” 
(unskilled, unrewarding work) and, coupled with technical progress, could include eliminating 
such unnecessary jobs altogether.203204205 Opponents of UBI may claim that the elimination of 
low-skill, low-wage jobs will cause numerous goods and services to become unavailable. 
Services, they may claim, become unavailable because workers are demanding wages that 
prevent the good or service from being produced profitably. This argument, however, is morally 
baseless. If goods and services can only be produced profitably by exploiting labor and paying 
wages that do not supply a decent standard of living, the goods and services ought not exist; 
consumption of goods and services produced via exploitation is unethical. If these goods and 
services are essential to a functioning society but cannot be produced profitably, they ought to be 
provided by the government. If the good or service truly provides social value, demand will be 
substantive enough to support decent wages. 
 The ability to leave paid work without sacrificing security, however, may incentivize 
individuals to take on work that isn’t valued by capitalist markets. There exists a litany of 
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valuable activities that people want to do but are badly organized by markets.206 A UBI could 
enable individuals to engage in politics, take up fine arts, or perform other desirable but unvalued 
activities. A UBI could also allow individuals to pursue paid work that better aligns with their 
individual preferences. This gives workers more autonomy and leverage in the labor market, 
reducing the class-based power imbalance inherent to capitalism.207 Indeed, capitalist concepts of 
property and labor markets create persistent inequalities among groups that can be mitigated by 
providing guaranteed subsistence.208 And while a UBI will not immediately rectify all grievances 
against those marginalized by capitalism, it could contribute to institutional change, improving 
long-term outcomes for workers.209 
 Closely related to this line of support is the feminist argument in favor of UBI. Women 
have gained independence from their husbands only to become dependent on wage labor, which 
often does not improve outcomes.210 Women, especially as heads of house, experience a notably 
higher degree of poverty than men and are more stigmatized and marginalized than men, ceteris 
paribus.211 In their working careers, women face disparities in pay, treatment, upward mobility, 
and task diversity.212213214215 Outside of their working careers, women are responsible for a 
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majority of unpaid, but necessary, home and care work.216217218 While housework is continually 
depicted as leisurely and enjoyable, those who perform care work describe it as a “labor of 
sorrow and drudgery.”219 Unpaid care work places a regressive time-tax on women, reducing the 
amount of time women can spend in the labor market or self-employment.220 Unpaid care work 
also shapes the duration and type of paid work that women can pursue, remanding them to jobs 
that are unskilled, have low pay, limited options for promotion, and few workplace 
protections.221 
 Some feminists fear that a UBI would perpetuate the status quo, reinforcing existing 
exploitative power structures and divisions of labor. Because of the power disparity in labor 
market interactions and social attitudes towards “women’s work,” women may face pressure to 
abandon the labor force to take on more home and care work.222223 Others argue that, when given 
the option to pursue either paid or unpaid work, women simply tend to choose unpaid work.224 A 
UBI, these critics say, would perpetuate gender norms by creating an incentive for women to 
pursue “women’s work.” Other critics claim that a UBI would not be sufficient to enable female  
labor market participation. Because care work is often discussed in a binary dichotomy (either 
self-provide or purchase childcare), paid work is often discussed in a binary dichotomy (either 
pursue paid work or perform care work). Real decisions of care, however, are not binary. Rather, 
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choices exist on a spectrum and utilize a number of paid and unpaid networks.225 A UBI, these 
critics argue, cannot account for the nuances of individual decisions of care. 
 Feminists who oppose UBI often do so because of a deeper contradiction in feminism 
that can be explained by Wollstonecraft’s Dilemma. It goes as follows: feminism has worked, on 
one hand, for a gender-neutral, equitable society. On the other hand, feminists have sought to 
have their distinctions from men recognized.226 Feminism, then, is simultaneously seeking to 
equate women with men while also differentiating women from men. UBI, however, can be a 
solution, rather than a victim, to this dilemma. UBI can fulfill the desire for equality and 
difference by creating a new kind of economic independence.227 Because benefits are distributed 
to individuals and not households, wives’ benefits cannot be usurped by husbands, democratizing 
citizenship and promoting self-government.228 Women, freed from coercive structures in the 
home and workplace, will be free to pursue their ambitions as individuals. By effectively 
providing a livable wage to care workers, a UBI would give each woman her own economic 
freedom, breaking the link between income, employment, and survival and replacing it with a 
link between citizenship, freedom, and the security to seek meaningful employment.229 
 Opponents of UBI claim there is a contradiction inherent in UBI proponents’ labor 
arguments. If a UBI is intended to address labor issues like automation, then one might not be 
concerned if individuals drop out of the labor market to pursue non-market work.230 
Alternatively, critics claim, it is assumed in the funding mechanism of most proposals that 
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aggregate income would not decrease in the face of new taxes.231 This creates a conundrum: it 
would be difficult for individuals to take on more non-market activities without exiting the labor 
market, but increasing the prevalence of non-market activities (and therefore decreasing labor 
market participation) would undermine the tax base that funds the UBI.232 But this argument 
oversimplifies the complex effects of a multifaceted policy goal. Opponents wrongly assume that 
the goal of a UBI is to make every person work more, less, or differently. Instead, the goal of a 
UBI is to allow each person to more freely pursue their preferences. By aiming to create a new 
kind of economic rights, a UBI avoids the contradiction claimed by opponents. 
Research Questions & Hypotheses 
 Panel and cross-sectional data collected from this experiment was analyzed using 
multivariate OLS regressions to answer four questions: when controlling for education levels and 
educational opportunities, do UBI recipients work less, and do they dedicate more time to leisure 
activities? Do UBI recipients invest in education more often or at a faster rate than non-
recipients? Do UBI recipients dedicate more resources to savings or consumption, both year-to-
year and in total, than non-recipients? Does a UBI enable recipients to pursue productive 
activities? That is, does a UBI have a multiplier effect? This author would hypothesize that UBI 
recipients would work slightly less than non-recipients, dedicating more time to education (when 
it is available) or leisure activities. UBI recipients are predicted to save more but consume at a 
level comparable to non-recipients. Finally, this author would expect a UBI to have a multiplier 
effect for subjects’ in-game scores. It should be noted, however, that the in-game multiplier 
effect is not quite the same as the multiplier effect observed in real-world pilot projects. Instead 
                                                          
231 Harvey, The relative cost of a universal basic income and a negative income tax, 14 
232 Ibid., 14 
35 
 
of through economic productivity, subjects would experience the multiplier effect if the UBI 
enabled them to increase their education and pursue leisure activities. Although the real-world 
and in-game multiplier effects are slightly different, observing the in-game multiplier effect can 
be interpreted to mean that UBI recipients are making decisions that maximize their own well-
being.  
Methods 
 Subjects were assigned profiles with varying education levels (Appendix Table 1). After 
reading the rules and mechanics of the game, subjects first chose how many hours to work in a 
week (0-40). The hours spent working was multiplied by the subject’s wage and the number of 
weeks in a year (52) to create an annual income. Any of the 40 hours not spent working became 
leisure time, which could be used for either education or leisure activities. Subjects in the control 
group only received income from working (and savings from past work) while subjects in the 
treatment group received a $12,000 UBI in each of the ten rounds. Subjects’ income, UBI, and 
savings were added to determine their total cash. Subjects then made decisions about 
consumption. All subjects were required to spend exactly $11,500 on required consumption, 
simulating money that must be spent on food, shelter, and other basic necessities in a year. 
Subjects had the option to purchase any amount of additional consumption goods (“extra 
goods”), with the upper limit being equal to their total cash. Subjects were not required to 
purchase any extra goods. After making decisions about consumption, subjects faced the 
possibility of a random event. Subjects rolled a ten-sided die and, if the ten-sided die landed on 
anything but 1, subjects did not face a random event and moved on. But, if the ten-sided die 
landed on 1, subjects rolled a six-sided die to determine the outcome of their random event. 
Random events could involve a low positive payout, a medium-sized spending requirement, or a 
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large spending requirement and could involve either cash or extra goods (Appendix Table 2). 
Random events were intended to simulate the costs that would accompany unexpected life 
events. Any unmet spending requirement penalized subjects’ scores by three times the unmet 
requirement.  
 After moving on from the random event, subjects had the opportunity to contribute to 
education. The game contained three levels of education (no education, level one education, level 
two education). Subjects began with either no education or level one education, meaning that all 
subjects had the opportunity to achieve at least one higher level of education. The requirements 
for obtaining level one and level two education were different: level one education necessitated 
only 25 leisure hours while level two education required 40 leisure hours and $30,000 (Appendix 
Table 3). Contributions to education could be spread over time so long as the contributions were 
continuous and remained above a minimum amount. Achieving a higher level of education 
earned subjects a wage increase in addition to points. Once a subject had achieved level two 
education, they could not become more educated. At that point, subjects could only use leisure 
time for leisure activities.  
 After determining contributions to education, any remaining leisure time was 
automatically dedicated towards leisure activities. At that point, the “year” was considered to be 
over. Subjects were able to view the points and penalties they earned in each round, their 
cumulative score, and their cumulative cash savings. Subjects would repeat this process for 10 
rounds. It is a common practice in experiments to have subjects make decisions over several 
periods, as it allows researchers to collect more data over a shorter period of time.233 The 
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collection of data from the same decisions made repeatedly over time also allows researchers to 
discern causes for decision-making changes over time, including fixed individual effects and 
learning.234 
 Different actions taken by subjects yielded different amount of in-game points (Appendix 
Table 4). Subjects received one point for every dollar spent on mandatory consumption up to the 
$11,500 requirement. Subjects could not spend any more than $11,500 on mandatory 
consumption and, as such, could not receive more than 11,500 points from mandatory 
consumption in any round. If the consumption requirement was not met, subjects’ scores were 
penalized by three times the unsatisfied requirement. For example, if a subject only spent 
$11,000 on mandatory consumption, their score would be penalized by 1500 points ($500 unmet 
requirement * 3). Penalties for random events were scored in the same manner.  
 Subjects received 0.75 points for every dollar spent on extra goods. While extra 
consumption was the lowest-scoring decision in terms of points per dollar, subjects were still 
incentivized to purchase extra goods to offset potential penalties resulting from random events. 
Any extra consumption past what it would take to satisfy the largest random penalty would be an 
inefficient use of resources based on the in-game scoring criteria.  
 Subjects received 1.2 points for every dollar spent on education. Time contributed to 
education was scored using the dollar value of leisure time which is equal to the amount the 
subject would have earned if they had worked. For example, if a subject earned $1,000 for 10 
hours of work, the dollar value of 10 hours of leisure time would be $1,000. The dollar value of 
leisure time contributed to education is scored the same way as cash spent on education: subjects 
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receive 1.2 points for every dollar value of leisure time spent on education. Education points 
were not awarded until a new education level was obtained; students who do not finish their 
education do not reap the benefits. Increasing their level of education raised subjects’ wages by 
about 10%, simulating the personal gain that results from getting a real-world education. 
Education was scored higher than consumption or savings to simulate the real-world societal 
pressure to get an education.   
 Leisure activities were also scored using the dollar value of leisure time. Subjects 
received 1.2 points for every dollar value of leisure time spent on leisure activities. Because 
subjects’ wages increased with their education, leisure time became more valuable as subjects 
increased their level of education. Subjects received 0.95 points for every dollar of savings, but 
only after the completion of the final round. Leisure activities were scored higher than 
consumption or savings to simulate the disutility of work. Subjects, to maximize their score, 
would have rather spent all their time on leisure and none on work. But subjects were required to 
spend some money on consumption and, if they were risk averse, spent additional money on 
extra consumption. Subjects, therefore, faced competing incentives concerning work and leisure. 
 Subjects could determine a dominant strategy the information they were given. A subject 
who recognized the dominant strategy would achieve level two education as fast as possible, 
dedicating all time and discretionary resources to this objective. After obtaining level two 
education, the subject would work as little as possible to maximize leisure activities while 
continuing to pay the mandatory consumption requirement. For a subject in the treatment group, 
this would entail not working at all. The dominant strategy assumes that there are no random 
events so a subject pursuing this strategy would not purchase any extra consumption goods. 
Risk-averse subjects could alter the dominant strategy and work to have enough extra goods and 
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savings to offset a potential random event. By utilizing this strategy, a subject would maximize 
the resources dedicated to the highest point-earning decisions while minimizing the resources 
dwindled on lower point-earning decisions.  
 After completing the experiment, subjects received compensation in the form of an 
Amazon gift card, the amount of which varied depending on subjects’ in-game scores (Appendix 
Table 5). While it is common for economic experiments to make use of financial incentives, 
payouts are typically awarded in cash.235236 Cash payments are common for two reasons: cash is 
universally valued and nonsatiable.237 Everyone values money (unlike grade-related payouts, 
which would only hold value to certain students in certain classes) and more cash is always 
better. Amazon gift cards make a suitable proxy for cash payouts in this scenario. Because 
Amazon gift cards can be used to purchase a practically infinite number of goods (over 506 
million in 2018238), it can be assumed that everyone values something that is sold on Amazon. 
This means that Amazon gift cards can be considered to have universal value. Further, because 
Amazon gift cards hold value in a manner comparable to cash, it can be assumed that Amazon 
gift cards are also nonsatiable.  
 Economic experiments use financial incentives to determine the impact of incentives on 
decision-making. A meta-analysis from Camerer and Hogarth (1999) found that financial 
incentives have a significant effect on judgement and decision-making tasks.239 Further, Smith 
and Walker (1993) found that decision-dependent payouts reduce the variance of decision-
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making around the predicted outcome.240 In other words, subjects follow incentives when it 
determines their payout. Economic theory presupposes a complete understanding of the 
relationship between an individual’s actions and their payoffs.241 This assumption is not 
irrational in the context of this experiment: each subject was given material detailing the 
requirements of the game, the different scoring mechanisms for different actions, and the 
financial incentive to take actions that score more points. It can be assumed that subjects 
understood the relationship between their actions and payoffs because they were given all the 
information necessary to make such a determination. Providing incentives encourages subjects to 
make decisions honestly, and non-arbitrary decision-making accurately reveals subjects’ 
preferences.242 Financial incentives have become essential to the internal validity of economic 
experiments and the value of using experiments to test economic theory.243  
 In order to accurately reveal subjects’ preferences, incentives must be large enough to 
compensate subjects for their time. To do so, the average payoff should be comparable to the 
income potential subjects could have earned from working at a campus job.244 Additionally, 
subjects must be compensated for thinking costs.245 This experiment had four potential payouts: 
$5, $10, $15, and $25. The expected payout for any one subject would be equal to $11.25 for 
approximately 30 minutes of their time. This translates to an approximate payout of $22.50 per 
hour, more than twice the wage of undergraduate student research positions at the University of 
South Dakota. Because the payout from the experiment is large enough to compensate subjects 
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for their time, the incentives utilized in the experiment could accurately reveal subjects’ 
preferences.  
 Traditionally, psychology experiments use a compensation scheme that is not dependent 
on the decisions that subjects make; each subject receives the same compensation. Economic 
experiments, however, use the concept of induced valuation to test economic theory, making 
subjects’ compensation dependent on the decisions they make.246 This allows researchers to test 
specific hypotheses against economic theories. Induced valuation was utilized to create a false 
utility function for subjects. The false utility function incentivized subjects to value leisure, 
education and vital consumption over work, savings, and non-vital consumption. Any deviation 
from the false utility function can be interpreted as a subject’s real utility function not aligning 
with the false utility function. In other words, if subjects do not pursue the optimal in-game 
strategy, the false utility function is not an accurate depiction of a subject’s true preferences. 
 There is also concern that a common subject pool for economic lab experiments, 
university students, do not act in a manner that is comparable to the general population.247 
Exadaktylos, Espin, and Garza (2015) examined the decision-making differences between self-
selected students and non-students in five different experiments, each using the exact same 
procedure for both subject groups, and found that self-selected students behave “in a very similar 
manner” with every other group tested.248 This held true in both individual comparisons (students 
versus other specific demographic groups) and larger comparisons (students versus the non-
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student group at large).249 The authors conclude that a sample of “self-selected college 
students… produces qualitatively and quantitatively accurate results.”250 
 Subjects’ decisions were analyzed using both panel and cross-sectional data. Panel data 
was created by treating every round from each subject as an individual observation. Panel data 
includes observations like the number of hours a subject worked in a particular round and a 
subject’s wage and education level for a particular round. Each subject, then, created ten 
observations in the panel dataset. This helped to reveal how subjects’ decisions changed over 
time in response to dynamic in-game factors like education and wage. Cross-sectional data was 
created by aggregating a subject’s ten individual observations to create data that could describe 
differences between two subjects’ large-scale decision making. Observations in the cross-
sectional data include the number of times a subject improved their education over ten rounds, a 
subject’s average contributions to education over ten rounds, and the average amount of time a 
subject dedicated to work or leisure over ten rounds. These observations do not show how 
subjects’ individual decisions changed in response to every in-game shift, but do reveal more 
generally the patterns in subjects’ aggregated decision-making.  
Results 
 Before discussing results, it is pertinent to define and discuss the variables and statistical 
tests used. Data was collected in each round for each subject’s profile, wage, education level, 
whether or not they received a UBI, and a number of other variables. Those variables are shown 
below in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6: Panel Data Variable Description 
Variable Description 
rd Round, 1-10 
profile1-4 Four separate dummy variables for the four different profiles 
UBI Dummy variable for UBI, =1 if receive UBI 
wage Wage 
someeduc Dummy variable, =1 if subject has more than no education 
hrswrk Hours spent working per week, 0-40 
excon Dollar amount spent on extra consumption goods 
randevnt Dummy variable, =1 if there was a random event in the round 
eductime Time contributed to education, hours 
educcash Cash contributed to education, dollars 
leisact Hours spent on leisure activities 
cashrd Amount of cash at the end of each round, dollars 
 
 Data from individual rounds was then aggregated to create variables to control for the 
number of levels of education a subject achieved, their average contributions to education, 
average time spent working, and total score. Those variables are shown in table 7 below.   
TABLE 7: Cross-Section Variable Description 
Variable Description 
deltaeduc Number of times a subject improved their education 
avgeduccash Average of educcash by subject 
avgeductime Average of eductime by subject 
avgexcon Average of excon by subject 
avgwork Average of hrswrk by subject 
avgleisact Average of leisact by subject 
totgoods Total goods purchased by each subject, dollars 
endcash Amount of cash at the conclusion of ten rounds 
totscore Total score at the conclusion of ten rounds 
edudrop Dummy variable, =1 if subject abandoned contributions to education 
 
 For statistical purposes, some variables were manipulated to create interaction terms and 
lagged variables. Interaction terms are created by multiplying the values of two variables to see if 
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the effect of one variable is dependent on another variable. For example, consider the following 
regression: 
 hrswrk = B0 + B1UBI + B2wage + B3ubiXwage 
 The variable ubiXwage is an interaction term between the dummy variable UBI and the 
wage variable. For someone receiving a UBI (UBI = 1) and earning $15 per hour (wage = 15), 
the value of ubiXwage would be 15. Interaction terms allow the effect of a variable to be 
different for the control and treatment groups. In the example above, the effect of a UBI on time 
spent working would be equal to B1 + B3wage, allowing wage to have a different effect for the 
control and treatment groups. Creating a lagged variable, unlike an interaction term, does not 
actually change any of the data values. Instead, a lagged variable uses a value from a previous 
time period as an explanatory factor in the current time period. For example, consider the 
following regression. 
 educcash = B0 + B1UBI + B2hrswrk + B3cashrdLAG 
 The variable cashrdLAG uses the value from cashrdn-1 to control for the amount of cash 
subjects had in the previous round. This regression would answer the question: what is the 
impact of a UBI on cash contributions to education, holding constant the amount of time spent 
working and cash savings from the previous year? A list of manipulated variables is shown in the 
table 8 on the following page. 
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TABLE 8: Manipulated Variable Description 
Variable Description 
ubiXp1-4 Interactions for UBI & each profile 
cashrdLAG cashrdn-1 
cashrdLAG2 cashrdn-2 
ubiXwage Interaction term, UBI * wage 
ubiXexcon Interaction term, UBI * excon 
 
 Now that variables have been defined and discussed, it is pertinent to discuss some 
summary statistics shown in the table below. 
TABLE 9: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UBI 1020 0.57 0.5 0 1 
wage 1020 13.05 4.49 7.25 18.25 
someeduc 1020 0.82 0.38 0 1 
hrswrk 1020 28.74 9.6 0 40 
excon 1020 3330 7789.7 0 100000 
randevnt 1020 0.078 0.27 0 1 
eductime 624 7.96 6.42 0 40 
educcash 460 5764.87 5949.71 0 30000 
leisact 1020 6.41 9.87 0 40 
cashrd 1020 46406.79 54852.09 0 304504 
deltaeduc 102 1.31 0.63 0 2 
avgeduccash 102 8068.3 6465.8 0 30000 
avgeductime 102 9.37 4.61 0 21.67 
avgexcon 102 3330 4708 0 23500 
avgwork 102 28.74 7.05 3.7 38.4 
avgleisact 102 6.41 6.93 0 32 
totgoods 102 33299.59 47080.09 0 235000 
endcash 102 85052.75 83828.56 0 304504 
totscore 102 340278.3 127056.6 75283 557325 
edudrop 102 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 
 First, it can be observed that variables used in the cross-sectional dataset have 102 
observations, as 102 subjects participated in the experiment. Most panel dataset variables have 
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1,020 observations, 10 observations for each of the 102 subjects. The eductime and educcash 
variables, because of the experiment’s design, were left null when subjects were not allowed to 
contribute time or money to education. When subjects had no education, they could not 
contribute cash because the first level of education only requires time contributions. Further, 
after subjects had achieved the highest level of education, no more contributions could be made, 
and both eductime and educcash were considered null. This allowed the true values of the 
variables to be used and the true effects to be revealed; including zeroes where the subject could 
not choose a number other than zero would obfuscate the true values and effects of these 
variables. Because of this, some regressions will be run in triplicate: once for when subjects 
could contribute to both education time and cash, once for when subjects could only contribute to 
education time, and once for when education was no longer a possibility.  
 Further, just over 50% of subjects received the UBI, creating a sizeable treatment and 
control group. The average wage was $13.05, although no subject ever earned that exact wage 
because wages were fixed at predetermined levels based on profile and education level. A 
subject in an average round spent about 28 hours working, spending about $3,330 on extra 
goods. This is less than the amount of extra goods it would take to offset the most serious 
random penalty, but this amount of consumption is capable of offsetting a moderate negative 
event. Subjects, in an average round, would contribute almost 8 hours to education and 
contribute about $5,800. About 11% of subjects would start an education that they did not 
complete. Only one of those subjects would be a UBI recipient. Lastly, there was a notable 
amount of variation in the excon, educcash, leisact, and totgoods variables, as the standard 
deviations of the mentioned variables all exceed the means. 
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 Because this research is primarily interested in determining the effect of UBI on life 
decisions, the primary variables of interest are UBI and any interaction terms created with UBI. 
While the presence of the other variables is important to avoid omitted variable bias, their 
coefficients and statistical significance are less important for the purposes of this research. 
Regressions were also tested for heteroskedasticity and functional form misspecification. 
Heteroskedasticity occurs when a regression’s error term is not constant for all values of X. 
Because heteroskedasticity causes bias in the coefficients, it must be corrected by using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (robust SEs). By using standard errors that are 
calculated slightly differently, heteroskedasticity, and the resulting bias, can be avoided. 
Regressions are tested for functional form misspecification to reveal if any linear trends are 
forced onto nonlinear data (or vice versa). To test for functional form misspecification (FFM), 
the squared and cubed predicted values of a model were included as explanatory variables in the 
original regression. If the squared or cubed predicted values are individually or jointly 
significant, the model suffers from functional form misspecification. Misspecification, however, 
does not cause bias in the coefficients or restrict the use of inferential statistics like t- and F-
statistics. Finally, each regression included a time trend variable (rd) to avoid spurious 
regression.  
 Regressions 1A, 1B, and 1C were designed to answer the question: when controlling for 
education levels and educational opportunities, do UBI recipients work less? Regression 1 was 
run in triplicate to account for the three educational scenarios mentioned above: no education 
(regression 1A), some education (regression 1B) and maximum education (regression 1C) 
obtained. 
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 Regression 1A explains about 80% of the variation in time spent working and did not 
suffer from heteroskedasticity or functional form misspecification. Shown in regression 1A, UBI 
recipients work about twelve hours less than non-recipients when they have the opportunity to 
contribute both time and money to education, an effect that is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Further, the positive coefficient on the interaction term ubiXwage can be interpreted to 
mean that increasing the wage of a UBI recipient by one dollar will lead the UBI recipient to 
work an additional 0.22 hours per week. This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Consumption of extra goods, while statistically significant with a positive effect on work for 
non-recipients, was associated with slight reductions in work but was not statistically significant.  
 Regression 1B explains slightly less variation in time spent working (76%) and was run 
using robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. Regression 1B also suffers from 
functional form misspecification, although this will not cause bias in the variable coefficients. 
UBI recipients, when they have the opportunity to contribute only time to education, work about 
14 hours less than non-recipients. As in regression 1A, this effect is statistically significant at the 
1% level. Further, the effect of wage on UBI recipients is nearly doubled to result in recipients 
working 0.43 hours more per week for each dollar that is added to their wage. This effect is 
significant at the 1% level. Finally, consuming extra goods is associated with a statistically 
significant reduction in time spent working for UBI recipients, a possible manifestation of the 
“surfing”. Non-recipients, on the other hand, tend to work more when they consume extra goods, 
likely because the consumption must be funded by wages earned from work.  
 Regression 1C explains almost 90% of the variation in time spent working and, like 
regression 1B, was run with robust standard errors and suffers from functional form 
misspecification. When UBI recipients have achieved the highest level of education, they work 
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about 2 hours less than non-recipients, an effect that is not statistically significant at the 10% 
level. The effect of wage on UBI recipients in regression 1C is the opposite of in regressions 1A 
and 1B: increasing the wage of a UBI recipient is associated with a statistically significant 0.5 
hour reduction in time spent working per week. This may be an example of subjects responding 
to in-game incentives: as subjects wages increased, the value of their leisure time increased, 
providing a stronger incentive for subjects to stop working. The effect of extra consumption on 
UBI recipients also changes when recipients do not have the ability to contribute to education. 
Extra consumption is associated with spending more time working for UBI recipients, an effect 
that is statistically significant and also practically significant: increasing extra consumption by 
one standard deviation, while holding other factors constant, would be associated with a 1.5 hour 
increase in time spent working for UBI recipients. The full results of regressions 1A-C are shown 
on the following page. 
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TABLE 10: Regression 1 
  Reg 1A Reg 1B Reg 1C 
Y =  hrswrk hrswrk hrswrk 
Adj. R-sq. 0.7969 0.7605 0.8881 
F 101 72 344 
n 408 214 345 
Robust SE No Yes Yes 
FFM No Yes Yes 
    
UBI        (-12.1)***        (-14.28)*** (-2.18) 
  [1.19] [3.07] [4.37] 
ubiXwage      (0.22)**        (0.43)***      (-0.53)** 
  [0.09] [0.16] [0.24] 
ubiXexcon (-0.00005)        (-0.0006)***      (0.0002)** 
  [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.00009] 
wage        (-1.14)***   (-3.23)*      (0.92)** 
  [0.18] [1.95] [0.38] 
excon        (0.0007)***        (0.001)***        (0.0009)*** 
  [0.00009] [0.0003] [0.00009] 
randevnt (0.157) (0.56) (1.23)* 
  [0.63] [0.92] [0.64] 
someeduc (-5.4) (2.46)  
  [3.38] [3.03]  
eductime        (-0.485)***      (-0.35)**  
  [0.04] [0.14]  
educcash        (0.0008)***   
  [0.00006]   
profile2 (0.62) (11.2)        (-15.1)*** 
  [1.34] [16.34] [2.5] 
profile3 (0.29) (1.29)        (4.27)*** 
  [0.52] [1.64] [1.19] 
profile4 (-0.82) (12.3)        (-15.33)*** 
  [1.48] [16.65] [2.81] 
cashrd        (0.0008)***        (0.0009)***        (0.001)*** 
  [0.00005] [0.0002] [0.00003] 
cashrdLAG        (-0.0008)***       (-0.0009)***        (-0.001)*** 
  [0.00005] [0.0002] [0.00004] 
cashrdLAG2        (-0.00001)*** (0.00000003) (-0.00002) 
  [0.000004] [0.000003] [0.00002] 
rd   (-0.2)*   (-0.31)* (0.036) 
  [0.11] [0.17] [0.17] 
cons        (48.7)***        (56.64)***      (10.46)** 
  [3.66] [14.64] [5.24] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance. * = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
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 Regressions 2A and 2B reveal the effect of a UBI on time spent on leisure activities. 
Regression 2A explains just over half of the variation in time dedicated to leisure activities and 
suffers from serious functional form misspecification (F = 94.37). According to regression 2A, 
UBI recipients dedicate almost 12 more hours to leisure time per week, holding all other factors 
constant, an effect that is statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, the effect of wage 
on leisure activity is negative for UBI recipients when given the opportunity to dedicate time and 
money to education, suggesting that UBI recipients, as their wages increase, may dedicate more 
resources to their education. The effect of a UBI on contributions to education will be discussed 
further below.  
 Regression 2B explains just under half of the variation in time dedicated to leisure 
activities when subjects could only contribute time to education. Regression 2B suffers from 
functional form misspecification (F = 27.75), and was run using robust standard errors. Similar 
to regression 2A, UBI recipients dedicate about 14 more hours to leisure time per week than non-
recipients, ceteris paribus.  Extra consumption is associated with a statistically significant 
increase in leisure activity for UBI recipients, opposite of the effect on non-recipients. The effect 
of wage on UBI recipients, interestingly, was negative in regressions 2A and 2B while positive 
for non-recipients. UBI recipients, then, dedicated less time to leisure activities as their wages 
increased, while non-recipients opted to take more leisure time as their wages increased. 
Regression 2 did not need to be run when subjects had achieved the highest level of education. 
Because once education was achieved the work-leisure decision became a binary dichotomy, 
running regression 2 when subjects had achieved the maximum level of education would reveal 
the exact same effects as regression 1C, just in the opposite direction.  
  
52 
 
TABLE 11: Regression 2 
  Reg 2A Reg 2B 
Y =  leisact leisact 
Adj. R-sq. 0.5368 0.4844 
F 30 23.85 
n 408 214 
Robust SE No Yes 
FFM Yes Yes 
   
UBI       (11.91)***        (14.2)*** 
  [1.17] [3.06] 
ubiXwage      (-0.201)**        (-0.43)*** 
  [0.09] [0.16] 
ubiXexcon (0.00004)        (0.00057)*** 
  [0.0001] [0.0002] 
wage       (1.124)*** (3.25)* 
  [0.18] [1.94] 
excon        (-0.0007)***        (-0.0015)*** 
  [0.00009] [0.0003] 
randevnt (-0.233) (-0.55) 
  [0.62] [0.92] 
someeduc (5.233) (-2.49) 
  [3.34] [3.01] 
eductime       (-0.501)***        (-0.65)*** 
  [0.04] [0.14] 
educcash        (-0.0008)***  
  [0.00006]  
profile2 (-0.61) (-11.39) 
  [1.32] [16.25] 
profile3 (-0.255) (-1.28) 
  [0.52] [1.63] 
profile4 (0.972) (-12.5) 
  [1.47] [16.55] 
cashrd        (-0.0008)***       (-0.0009)*** 
  [0.00005] [0.0002] 
cashrdLAG        (0.0008)***        (0.0009)*** 
  [0.00005] [0.0002] 
cashrdLAG2        (0.00001)*** (-0.000000008) 
  [0.000004] [0.000003] 
rd   (0.208)*   (0.313)* 
  [0.11] [0.17] 
cons     (5.233)** (-16.78) 
  [3.62] [14.55] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance.                                               
* = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
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 Regressions 3, 4, and 5 aim to discern the effect of a universal basic income on money 
and time dedicated to education. Regression 3 will utilize panel data to examine each year as an 
individual observation while regressions 4 and 5 will utilize cross-sectional data to analyze the 
aggregated decisions of each subject. Looking first at regression 3A, UBI recipients contribute 
more than $6,000 more to their education than non-recipients when controlling for other factors, 
an effect that is statistically significant at the 1% level. Turning to regression 3B, UBI recipients 
dedicate 8.6 hours more to their education per week when controlling for other factors, an effect 
that is again statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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TABLE 12: Regression 3 
  Reg 3A Reg 3B 
Y =  educcash eductime 
Adj. R-sq. 0.7659 0.5728 
F 154.83 130.4 
n 408 408 
Robust SE Yes Yes 
FFM No Yes 
   
UBI        (6335.71)***        (8.573)*** 
  [1030] [1.88] 
ubiXwage (62.43) (-0.073) 
  [80] [0.12] 
ubiXexcon        (-0.386)***    (-0.0002)* 
  [0.11] [0.0001] 
wage        (1015.99)***       (1.056)*** 
  [108] [0.19] 
excon        (-0.355)***       (-0.0007)*** 
  [0.1] [0.0001] 
randevnt (-695.2) (0.485) 
  [588] [0.85] 
someeduc      (1922.12)**        (3.22)*** 
  [769] [1.1] 
eductime (-122)*   
  [63]   
educcash        (-0.0003)** 
    [0.0001] 
profile2        (-2554.4)*** (-0.176) 
  [566] [1.05] 
profile3      (-928.03)** (-0.051) 
  [435] [0.73] 
profile4      (-2487)** (-1.05) 
  [988] [1.37] 
cashrd        (-0.653)***       (-0.0007)*** 
  [0.055] [0.00009] 
cashrdLAG         (0.686)***        (0.0007)*** 
  [0.058] [0.0001] 
cashrdLAG2 (0.0034) (-0.000006) 
  [0.004] [0.000004] 
rd        (-420.2)***        (-0.492)*** 
  [119] [0.15] 
cons        (-4167.5)*** (-2.63) 
  [1128] [1.84] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance.                                               
* = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
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 Regression 4A shows the effect of a UBI on cash contributions to education while 
holding constant a subject’s starting profile. Profile 1 has been excluded from the regression to 
avoid collinearity and, as such, the coefficients on profile2, profile3, and profile4 are interpreted 
in comparison to profile1. If the coefficient on a profile variable is positive, that profile gave 
larger cash contributions to education than profile 1, and vice versa. If another profile variable 
were to have a coefficient of zero, the two profiles would be associated with the same level of 
cash contributions to education. Additionally, interaction terms between UBI and the profile 
variables were created to reveal differing effects of a UBI on different socioeconomic groups. 
Profiles 2 and 4 made the largest cash contributions to education, which is reasonable 
considering that these profiles started with higher wages. Profiles 1 and 3 made notably smaller 
cash contributions to education. Profile 1 benefitted the most from a UBI in terms of cash 
contributions to education, although all profiles who received a UBI increased their cash 
contributions to education at some level, ranging from about $1,800 for profile 4 (initially the 
highest-paid, most educated profile) to almost $10,000 for profile 1 (initially the lowest-paid, 
least educated profile). Even when controlling for aggregate decisions about consumption, work, 
and leisure in regression 4B, UBI recipients make statistically significantly larger cash 
contributions to education. These results align with results from real-world pilot projects, 
suggesting that a UBI is used to acquire human capital, especially by the most disadvantaged.  
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TABLE 13: Regression 4 
  Reg 4A Reg 4B 
Y =  avgeduccash avgeduccash 
Adj. R-sq. 0.5371 0.5211 
F 14.95 14.52 
n 102 102 
Robust SE Yes Yes 
FFM Yes Yes 
   
UBI       (9854.24)***      (7096.49)*** 
  [2243] [2114] 
ubiXp2 (-3405) (-1431.62) 
  [3017] [2709] 
ubiXp3  (-6239.55)* (-3363.97) 
  [3263] [2922] 
ubiXp4       (-8084.1)*** (-4487.88) 
  [3052] [2784] 
profile2     (5368.3)**   (3667.42)* 
  [2291] [2094] 
profile3 (1078.84) (2450.22) 
  [2415] [2133] 
profile4     (4953.14)**       (6847.23)*** 
  [2202] [2043] 
avgexcon       (-0.27)** 
    [0.11] 
avgwork         (-1890.33)*** 
    [399] 
avgleisact         (-1813.92)*** 
    [404] 
cons (1812.4)        (68719.7)*** 
  [1620] [14212] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance.                                   
* = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
 
 Regression 5 uses the same method as regression 4 to determine the impact of a UBI on 
time spent on education. UBI recipients, regardless of their profile, dedicated more time to 
obtaining their education. Like in regression 4, the most well-off profiles tend to make the largest 
contributions to education and, as such, benefit the least from receiving a universal basic income. 
57 
 
The effect of a UBI on average contributions to education time, however, cannot be confirmed to 
vary by profile: while two of the three UBI/profile interaction terms were statistically significant 
in regression 4, none are significant in regression 5. This can be interpreted to mean that the 
effect of a UBI on the average amount of time contributed to education does not vary by profile. 
When other in-game decisions are controlled for in regression 5B, the effect of a UBI on average 
contributions to education time loses its statistical significance and all interaction terms remain 
insignificant, suggesting that decisions about work and leisure may be stronger determinants than 
the presence of a universal basic income. A UBI, however, by enabling subjects to work less, 
may allow subjects to dedicate more time, on average, to education.  
TABLE 14: Regression 5 
  Reg 5A Reg 5B 
Y =  avgeductime avgeductime 
Adj. R-sq. 0.111 0.5709 
F 4.15 20.2 
n 102 102 
Robust SE No No 
FFM Yes No 
   
UBI        {3.26)***        (1.75)*** 
  [0.87] [0.65] 
profile2 (1.19) (0.11) 
  [1.2] [0.86] 
profile3 (-0.28)       (3.02)*** 
  [1.3] [0.97] 
profile4 (0.92)        (3.2)*** 
  [1.2] [1] 
avgexcon   (-0.0001) 
    [0.00007] 
avgwork          (-1.96)*** 
    [0.25] 
avgleisact         (-1.68)*** 
    [0.25] 
cons        (6.97)***        (74.37)*** 
  [1] [8.6] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance.                          
* = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
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 Regression 6 aims to reveal the effect of a UBI on year-to-year cash savings. Regression 
6, like regression 1, was run in triplicate to account for the effect of a UBI when recipients have 
no education (6A), some education (6B), and the highest level of education (6C). Looking at 
regression 6A, a UBI, when controlling for savings in the previous two periods, contributions to 
education, and consumption, among other factors, is associated with a more than $7,000 increase 
in annual savings. As would be expected, increasing extra consumption for both the treatment 
and control groups reduces savings, although to a lesser magnitude for the treatment group. This 
suggests that UBI recipients could increase their extra consumption while still receiving net 
savings, creating the potential for increases in aggregate demand and general economic 
equilibrium effects. Regression 6B yields comparable results to regression 6A: UBI recipients 
save almost $10,000 more per year than non-recipients when controlling for the abovementioned 
factors and continue to experience the negative effects of extra consumption on savings at a 
lower magnitude than non-recipients. When subjects have no opportunity to improve their 
education (regression 6C), the effect of UBI on cash savings loses its statistical significance. The 
ability of subjects to achieve an education (or more broadly the ability to acquire human capital), 
then, appears to be an important determinant in the effect of a universal basic income.  
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TABLE 15: Regression 6 
  Reg 6A Reg 6B Reg 6C 
Y =  cashrd cashrd cashrd 
Adj. R-sq. 0.9887 0.9979 0.9824 
F 3194.5 13830 2875.3 
n 408 214 345 
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes 
FFM Yes Yes Yes 
    
UBI       (7367.4)***       (9695.7)*** (4431.8) 
  [1154] [1229] [3433] 
ubiXwage (118.73)     (171.44)** (-87.74) 
  [91] [100] [223] 
ubiXexcon       (-0.4)***     (-0.26)**        (-0.53)*** 
  [0.11] [0.12] [0.15] 
wage       (1221.01)***    (-3033.1)* (-29.89) 
  [133] [1814] [809] 
excon        (-0.59)***       (-0.72)***       (-0.36)*** 
  [0.086] [0.11] [0.13] 
randevnt (-655) (-96.01) (161.41) 
  [802] [555] [1850] 
someeduc (579.57)      (5681.3)**   
  [945] [2576]   
educcash        (-0.9)***     
  [0.038]     
eductime       (-440.39)***        (-548.4)***   
  [45] [66]   
profile2       (-2465.3)***     (33384.4)** (4368.2) 
  [860] [14058] [6938] 
profile3 (-449.36) (1117.8)      (3000.8)** 
  [471] [1728] [1167] 
profile4 (-1850.3)      (36121.7)** (1880.4) 
  [1310] [14323] [7690] 
cashrdLAG        (1.04)***       (1.04)***        (1.21)*** 
  [0.011] [0.006] [0.06] 
cashrdLAG2 (0.006) (0.003) (-0.08) 
  [5] [0.003] [0.07] 
rd        (-613.9)***        (-679.3)***       (-2087.9)*** 
  [150] [118] [441] 
cons (-1985.3)      (28129.4)**        (19090.2)*** 
  [1532] [13185] [6898] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance.               * = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
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 Regression 7 shows the effect of a UBI on total cash savings at the conclusion of the final 
round when controlling for other in-game factors. Only controlling for profile, UBI recipients 
ended the simulation with about $75,000 more than non-recipients. Even when controlling for a 
number of in-game factors, including profile, the number of times the subject improved their 
education, and their average time spent working, the effect of a UBI on endcash is large 
($46,000) and statistically significant.  
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TABLE 16: Regression 7 
  Reg 7A Reg 7B 
Y =  endcash endcash 
Adj. R-sq. 0.3845 0.9821 
F 15.39 635.15 
n 102 102 
Robust SE Yes Yes 
FFM No No 
   
UBI         (74471.76)***        (46081)*** 
  [12171.4] [9234] 
profile2        (85382.59)*** (6527.91) 
  [15013.43] [14249] 
profile3 (5371.24) (-19858.37) 
  [8617.73] [15854] 
profile4      (56236.5)*** (10055.63) 
  [17434.84] [23562] 
deltaeduc   (13104.15) 
    [29890] 
avgeduccash   (-0.023) 
    [0.49] 
avgeductime   (-103.85) 
    [752.2] 
avgwork   (12866.7) 
    [7188] 
avgleisact   (3545.28) 
    [7202] 
totgoods         (-0.87)*** 
    [0.053] 
edudrop   (26991.6) 
    [28782] 
totscore         (0.57)*** 
    [0.071] 
cons (764.48) (-517929.7) 
  [7606.8] [296052] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance.                                               
* = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
 
 Regression 8 uses the same method as regression 7 to determine the effect of a UBI on 
the amount of total extra goods consumed over the course of a subject’s ten rounds in the 
simulation. Only controlling for profile, UBI recipients ended the simulation having spent about 
$18,600 more on extra consumption goods than non-recipients. When controlling for factors 
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similar to regression 7, UBI recipients end the simulation having purchased almost $51,000 more 
extra goods than non-recipients, again demonstrating the potential for positive aggregate demand 
shocks.   
TABLE 17: Regression 8 
  Reg 8A Reg 8B 
Y =  totgoods totgoods 
Adj. R-sq. 0.1807 0.801 
F 5.23 32.26 
n 102 102 
Robust SE Yes No 
FFM No Yes 
   
UBI     (18621.5)**        (50858.7)*** 
  [8041] [8997] 
profile2      (18480.7)** (19081.2) 
  [8985] [14168] 
profile3 (10790) (-9746.6) 
  [8003] [16304] 
profile4        (48239)*** (32668.6) 
  [11979] [23927] 
deltaeduc   (17333.4) 
    [31013] 
avgeduccash   (-0.43) 
    [0.49] 
avgeductime   (-453.2) 
    [753] 
avgwork   (11079.5) 
    [7544] 
avgleisact   (3066.6) 
    [7540] 
endcash          (-0.99)*** 
    [0.15] 
edudrop   (20597.1) 
    [30000] 
totscore          (0.45)*** 
    [0.08] 
cashrdLAG   (0.15) 
    [0.17] 
cons (2104) (-442199) 
  [4979] [310729] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance.                                               
* = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
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 Regression 9, the final model that will be examined individually before piecing the 
models together to create a more holistic vision of the effects of a UBI, reveals the presence or 
absence of a “multiplier effect” observed in some real-world pilot projects. A multiplier effect is 
observed when a recipient uses their UBI to improve their financial well-being by an amount that 
is greater than the value of the UBI. In pilot projects, the multiplier effect is observed when 
recipients use their UBI to acquire human capital, raising their long-term earnings by more than 
the amount of the UBI; recipients invest $1 to earn $2 more dollars. In the simulation, each 
subject was given $120,000 over the course of ten rounds. If $115,000 was spent on basic 
necessities over the course of ten rounds and the other $5,000 was saved, a UBI would be 
expected to add 119,750 points to a subject’s in-game score. If the presence of a UBI is 
associated with an increase in score that exceeds 119,750 points, recipients took actions that 
improved their well-being by an amount that exceeds the value of the UBI; the multiplier effect 
is observed. Regression 9 reveals that the presence of a UBI is associated with a score increase of 
over 135,000, indicating that subjects used their UBI beneficially. This results in a multiplier 
effect of 1.14: UBI recipients were able to turn each dollar given to them into 1.14 points.  
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TABLE 18: Regression 9 
  Reg 9A Reg 9B 
Y =  totscore totscore 
Adj. R-sq. 0.8829 0.9034 
F 191.37 135.98 
n 102 102 
Robust SE No No 
FFM No No 
   
UBI       (137108.6)***        (121992.5)*** 
  [8745] [9810] 
profile2        (185729.5)***        (178768.3)*** 
  [12014] [12292] 
profile3 (11054.3)      (34823)** 
  [13130] [15647] 
profile4       (210807.1)***         (221108.3)*** 
  [12337] [16064] 
endcash   (-0.01) 
    [0.061] 
deltaeduc     (25834.8)* 
    [13718] 
edudrop   (-33653.2) 
    [20907] 
cons        (147789.6)***        (121547.3)*** 
  [10149] [25486] 
Note: stars (*) denote significance.                                               
* = 10%. ** = 5%, *** = 1% 
 
Discussion 
 It is appropriate, now, to aggregate the answers to individual questions to create a more 
holistic picture of the effects of a UBI on life decisions. According to the models above, UBI 
recipients work less than non-recipients and do dedicate some of that time to leisure activity. 
However, UBI recipients also dedicate more resources (in terms of both time and money) to 
education in any given round. The same effect holds true across subjects when decisions are 
aggregated. Even though they tend to work less, UBI recipients had higher levels of year-to-year 
saving in addition to more savings at the conclusion of the simulation. And while UBI recipients 
65 
 
saved more than non-recipients, they also spent more on consumption goods. This could 
represent potential aggregate demand and general equilibrium effects, but it could also represent 
a less-than-optimal use of UBI resources. All in all, however, UBI recipients use their UBI to 
increase their in-game score by more than the amount of the UBI they were given by 14%. 
 The results of this experiment align imperfectly with the results of real-world pilots. The 
effect on work, for the most part, aligns with most pilot results. In pilot projects, some small 
reductions in work have been observed. In many pilots, this time was used by subjects to 
improve their education or acquire human capital. The same holds true of this experiment. Larger 
reductions in time spent working were observed in the simulation, possibly due to the 
simulation’s inability to account for complex social factors that have been shown to influence 
work decisions. UBI recipients did, however, achieve higher levels of education at a faster rate 
than non-recipients, regardless of their wage or education level at the beginning of the 
simulation. After subjects had achieved the highest level of education, the effect of a UBI on 
work shrunk dramatically and became statistically insignificant. This is consistent with several 
trials that have found no large-scale aggregate reduction in time spent working. The acquisition 
of human capital by UBI recipients in the simulation contributed to a multiplier effect, similar to 
the multiplier effect observed in some pilot projects where UBI recipients have improved their 
financial security by more than the nominal amount of the cash transfer. The acquisition of 
human capital, in addition to positive aggregate demand shocks and general equilibrium effects, 
helps offset the large-scale effect of a UBI on work. As mentioned above, individuals with more 
human capital tend to work more. So, by enabling individuals to acquire human capital, a UBI 
may also enable future labor market participation. Further, the ability of individuals to increase 
their consumption may create a positive shock to aggregate demand, enabling economic growth.  
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 There are, however, a number of shortcomings to using simulations in general to 
predicting real-world effects of a policy. First, there are a number of factors and effects that 
interact with each other and cannot be simultaneously captured by a simulation. For example, 
while this experiment revealed that a UBI did have a notable impact on education, the effect of 
this educational attainment on improving health outcomes or child developments would be 
difficult to model. Additionally, the effect on democracy would be difficult to measure due to the 
social components of democratic decision making. 
 There are several aspects of this specific model that could be improved to create a more 
realistic simulation. First, the question of funding and taxes was not addressed in this simulation. 
Adding taxes to the model could affect individual decision making as recipients would have to 
pay taxes, some of whose taxes would exceed their UBI payment. This would likely affect 
individuals’ work and consumption decisions. Further, taxes could have a serious effect on 
overall economic conditions, which were also not controlled for in this simulation. Taxes, as well 
as individual decisions about work, would have a significant effect on economic growth and 
could either bolster or erode the support and feasibility of a UBI. 
 Another aspect of this simulation that could be improved is the scoring mechanism. The 
weighted scoring could be changed to more accurately reflect the desirability of or individual 
utility gained from certain outcomes. By creating a model that more accurately reflects how 
subjects truly feel about certain decisions or outcomes, future researchers could observe effects 
that would be more comparable and applicable to the real world. By creating a model that 
encouraged subjects to take socially undesirable outcomes, researchers could test to what extent 
subjects respond to incentives. This could have two outcomes: first, if subjects respond to 
incentives, incentives could be constructed to accompany the UBI to achieve socially desirable 
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outcomes. Further, by measuring subjects’ responsiveness to incentives, researchers could gain a 
more realistic understanding of the relative value of outcomes to individuals. 
 One final addition that could improve this experiment would be to collect data from 
participants via a survey at the conclusion of the simulation. There would be a number of ways to 
collect data on a number of different topics, ranging from a quantitative 1-to-5 measurement of 
how well subjects understood the simulation and the consequences of their actions to a 
qualitative, open-ended questions concerning how they felt about receiving the UBI and whether 
or not they felt like it improved their outcome. This, in addition to improving model design, 
could provide additional insight into the psychological effects of an unconditional cash transfer. 
Conclusion 
 A universal basic income (UBI) is a universal, unconditional, cash payment regularly 
distributed to all individuals in a geographic area regardless of employment or economic status. 
While a UBI is discussed as a singular policy, there are a number of ways in which UBI and 
UBI-like policies are different from each other, each with its own unique construction and 
effects. A UBI may have a number of simultaneous primary effects, including but not limited to: 
improving economic security, achieving a just distribution of wealth, reducing poverty, 
combatting the negative effects of automation on labor, and ultimately separating paid work from 
survival. By providing unconditional security, UBI could reduce the uncertainty in the future of 
work while also reducing economic inequality. Equity, equality, and security are three important 
determinants of economic growth, which has a significant impact on politics and democracy. By 
mitigating wealth inequality and promoting equitable economic growth, a UBI could strengthen 
democratic principles while reducing support for extreme political platforms that marginalize 
minority groups. In addition to supporting marginalized groups, a UBI could support the 
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impoverished by providing income support that is simple, free of stigma, and without poverty 
traps. Because poverty is merely a cash shortage, not a symptom of personal irresponsibility or 
inferiority, a UBI has the potential to reduce absolute poverty. This would have two effects on 
the economy: first, the costs of poverty to the economy mentioned above (healthcare utilization, 
economic crime, maltreatment of homeless children, etc.) would be reduced. Second, because 
unconditional cash transfers in pilots and this simulation have not been wasted, UBI enables 
human capital accumulation, labor market participation, and entrepreneurship. This increases the 
economic productivity of recipients, resulting in a multiplier effect. A UBI could, then, have 
multigenerational effects that have not been captured by simulations or pilot projects. The 
positive effects of a cash transfer may continue to be realized for years, or possibly even decades.  
 While there are a number of reasons to support a UBI, there are also some criticisms. 
First, a UBI would be very expensive and would necessitate a substantial increase in government 
revenue collections and spending. However, there are ways to both reduce the cost of the policy 
(reducing the transfer amount for children under 16, excluding some based on age or family 
income) and raise revenue for the program (eliminate obsolete programs, reduce defense 
spending, new taxes). While these policy options all have their tradeoffs, it is clear that a full 
UBI could, with ample political will, be funded in the United States. Other critics of UBI claim 
that “Malibu surfers and welfare hippies” will stop working, creating negative labor market and 
economic effects.251 This, however, does not seem to be true. While the full labor market effects 
of a nationwide UBI have yet to be observed, evidence from pilot projects and this simulation 
have found only small to moderate reductions in work. This time was used, in part, to acquire 
human capital, which may have enabled transfer recipients to re-enter the labor market. The total 
                                                          
251 Van Parijs, Why surfers should be fed, 130 
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effect of a UBI on work, then, appears to be minimal, especially when accounting for the 
increased demand for labor that would accompany a positive shock to aggregate demand.  
 In this experiment, subjects played a game in which they were assigned profiles with 
varying education levels and wages. About half of all subjects received a UBI. Subjects made 
decisions about work, consumption, education, and leisure, and savings while also having to be 
prepared for random events. The weighted scoring mechanisms provided different rewards for 
different actions, incentivizing subjects to improve their education and then maximize their 
leisure time. Both panel and cross-sectional data were analyzed using multivariate OLS 
regressions to answer four questions: when controlling for education levels and educational 
opportunities, do UBI recipients work less, and do they dedicate more time to leisure activities? 
Do UBI recipients invest in education more often or at a faster rate than non-recipients? Do UBI 
recipients dedicate more resources to savings or consumption, both year-to-year and in total, than 
non-recipients? Does a UBI result in a multiplier effect? It was hypothesized that UBI recipients 
would work slightly less, dedicating that time mostly to education and partially to leisure 
activities. It was further hypothesized that a multiplier effect would be observed, and that UBI 
recipients would save more but consume at a similar level to non-recipients. These hypotheses 
turned out to be partially correct: UBI recipients worked marginally less than anticipated and 
dedicated a larger-than-expected share of their leisure time to leisure activities. However, the 
effect of a UBI on work once education was no longer available shrunk dramatically and became 
statistically insignificant. This aligns with real-world pilots, where the effect of a UBI on work at 
large has been small. Also like real-world pilots, a multiplier effect was observed. This implies 
that simulation participants used their UBI to achieve outcomes that improved their well-being 
by an amount that exceeded the nominal value of the cash transfer. Finally, UBI recipients did 
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save more than non-recipients, but also consumed more than non-recipients. While this does not 
align with the author’s hypothesis, it does align with some real-world pilot results where an 
unconditional cash transfer created a positive shock to aggregate demand, resulting in positive 
general economic equilibrium effects.  
 While this experiment has provided some weight to the arguments of UBI proponents, 
there are tradeoffs to using simulations as opposed to pilot projects to predict the real-world 
effects of public policy. Especially with a universal basic income, there are a number of complex 
social, psychological, and economic interactions that are difficult to model simultaneously. 
Without controlling for or being able to observe these interactions, the full potential effects of a 
UBI, positive or negative, may never be completely revealed. Future researchers can improve the 
value of this model by modifying the scoring mechanisms to test hypotheses, adding controls for 
taxes or economic conditions, and collecting data from participants after completing the survey. 
Taking these actions could help researchers to reveal some of the many potential effects of a UBI 
that were not captured in this model.  
 A universal basic income would no doubt represent a significant departure from 
traditional social policy. However, in an era of costly poverty, rising economic inequality, and 
threatening automation, the costs of defending the status quo could be remarkable. A UBI is a 
forward-looking social policy that respects personal autonomy, promotes agency and self-
government, and reinforces democratic principles. Universal basic income, by separating paid 
work from survival, enables individuals to pursue a more prosperous life, resulting in positive 
outcomes for both the recipient and society. The positive results observed in real-world pilots 
and this experiment warrant further study. Policymakers should continue to consider UBI as an 
alternative to the traditional approach to social policy.  
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Appendix: Player Manual 
 PURPOSE 
The purpose of the game is to maximize your score. The higher your score, the more you will be compensated at the end of the 
game. You earn points by buying goods, improving your education, participating in leisure activities, and saving money. Each 
action is scored differently, so how you use your money and time have a significant impact on your final score. After 10 rounds, 
your score will be totaled, and you will be compensated. After reading the player manual, you can see how each action is 
scored by viewing the SCORING table. 
 PROFILE 
Before beginning the game, you will receive one of four profiles. Your profile contains important characteristics like education 
and income level. Your profile will be either low-income (LI) or medium-income (MI), and either educated or uneducated. Your 
income level and education are used to determine your wage. You will have the opportunity to improve your education, which 
will provide a boost to your wage. To see the characteristics of your profile, see: PROFILE table. 
 INCOME 
Your income is your money that can be saved or used to buy goods or education. Your income is determined by your wage and 
the number of hours you choose to work in a week. You can work up to 40 hours a week (in 5-hour increments), or you could 
choose to not work. To view your profile’s potential incomes, see: INCOME table. 
 UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME (UBI)*252 
Each round you will receive $12,000, called a Universal Basic Income, in addition to any income you may choose to earn. There 
are no requirements to receive a Universal Basic Income, and there are no conditions on spending the money. As with the rest 
of your income, you are free to spend your Universal Basic Income how you please (keeping in mind the rules of the game). 
 LEISURE TIME 
Any time not spent working is leisure time.  
LEISURE TIME = 40 – HOURS WORKING/WK. 
Leisure time can be used to improve education or spent on leisure activities. In either scenario, leisure time is scored by finding 
the dollar value of leisure time. The dollar value of leisure time is the income that you would have earned if you had used your 
leisure time to work. The dollar value of leisure time can be found using the INCOME table. Go to the INCOME table and, using 
your leisure time for the number of hours and your wage, find the dollar value of your leisure time. 
DOLLAR VALUE OF LEISURE TIME = # HOURS * WAGE  
 GOODS REQUIREMENT 
You are required to purchase $11,500 of goods each round (things you absolutely need to get through the year, like housing, 
food, etc.) or face a penalty to your score. For every $1 spent on goods up to the $11,500 requirement, you will be awarded 1 
point. If you fail to meet the goods requirement, your score will be penalized by three times the remaining requirement. 
PENALITY = 3 * ($11,500 - $ OF PLAYER GOODS CONTRIBUTED) 
 
                                                          
* This section was only included for individuals in the treatment group. 
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 EXTRA GOODS 
After satisfying the $11,500 requirement, you can continue to purchase extra goods (things you don’t need to get through the 
year, but enjoy having, like videogames, bicycles, makeup, etc.). For every $1 spent on extra goods after the $11,500 
requirement, you will be awarded 0.75 points. Purchasing additional goods after the requirement may be important, as random 
events may require you to forfeit goods or face a penalty to your score. 
 RANDOM EVENT 
Each round there will be a 1-in-10 chance that a random event will occur. In the case of a random event, one of six scenarios 
may occur. Scenarios may involve cash or goods and may be positive or negative. Negative events may be large or small. If the 
random event is positive, the goods or cash are awarded. If the event is negative, you will be required to forfeit cash or goods. 
If you don’t have the cash or goods to pay the requirement, you will be penalized by three times the remaining payment.  
PENALTY = 3 * (REQUIRED PAYMENT – PLAYER CONTRIBUTION) 
 EDUCATION 
As mentioned above, your education impacts your wage. If you began as uneducated, you can ‘get educated’ and receive a 
boost to your wage at the beginning of the next round. After you are educated, you can invest in higher education to receive 
another boost to your wage. To see the requirements of obtaining education and the reward for doing so, see the EDUCATION 
table and your Education Scorecard. Contributions to education carry over between rounds, so long as you contribute at least 5 
hours (and $5,000 for higher ed) per year. 
 
Education is scored after finishing a new level of education. If contributions to education are abandoned before completing the 
requirements, no points are awarded. For every $1 spent on education, 1.2 points will be awarded. Leisure time spent on 
education is scored by calculating the dollar value of leisure time. For every $1 value of leisure time, 1.2 points will be awarded. 
The points earned from achieving each level of education are shown on your Education Scorecard.  
 LEISURE ACTIVITY 
Time not spent working can be spent on leisure activities (concerts, hiking, traveling, and other experiences). Leisure time can 
only be utilized for education or leisure activities. Leisure activities are scored by finding the dollar value of leisure time. For 
every $1 value of leisure activity, 1.2 points will be awarded. 
 SAVINGS 
Saved cash carries over between rounds. Savings may be important, as random events may require you to pay a fee or face a 
penalty to your score (see: RANDOM EVENT section). After ten rounds, your savings will be scored. For every $1 of savings after 
10 rounds, 0.95 points will be awarded. 
 THE SCORECARD 
Along with the player manual, you should have scorecards and gameplay instructions. The gameplay instructions contain step-
by-step instructions that correspond with the numbered on the blanks on the scorecard. Filling out your scorecard correctly is 
essential to receiving proper compensation. After you have completed the game, return your scorecards and all other 
materials. Once all materials have been returned and scorecards have been checked, you will be compensated according to 
your final score.  
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TABLE 1: Profile Table 
PROFILE  INCOME EDUCATION WAGE 
Profile 1 Low  Uneducated $7.25 
Profile 2 Medium  Uneducated $15 
Profile 3 Low Educated $8 
Profile 4 Medium Educated  $16.50 
TABLE 2: Random Event Table 
SCENARIO  OUTCOME CATEGORY 
Scenario 1 Christmas Bonus, +$600 Monetary (Positive) 
Scenario 2 Fired from Job, -$5,800 Monetary (High Negative) 
Scenario 3 Temporarily Laid Off, -$2,900 Monetary (Low Negative) 
Scenario 4 Inheritance, +$600 of goods Goods (Positive) 
Scenario 5 Natural Disaster, -$5,800 of goods Goods (High Negative) 
Scenario 6 Contaminated Food, -$2,900 of goods Goods (Low Negative) 
TABLE 3: Education Table 
EDUCATION LEVEL HR REQ $ REQ REWARD 
Uneducated - - - 
Educated 25 HRS - LI: $0.75; MI $1.50 
Higher Education 40 HRS $30,000 LI: $1; MI: $1.75 
TABLE 4: Scoring Table 
ACTION SCORE (PER $1 OR HR) CARRY OVER? 
Savings 0.95 at conclusion of Rd. 10 Yes 
Goods 1 up to $11,500; 0.75 afterward No 
Leisure time $ VALUE of LEISURE * 1.2 No 
Education Cash & $ VAL of LEISURE * 1.2 Yes, if continuous 
TABLE 5: Scoring Table 
SCORE REWARD 
Less than 200,000 pts. $5 
200,000 – 374,999 pts. $10 
375,000 – 524,999 pts. $15 
525,000+ pts. $25 
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